MAINTENANCE
OF
LAW AND ORDER

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Edited by
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“Learning to Serve”
Administrative Training
Institute
Government of West Bengal
MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER

Lectures delivered at the Lal Bahadur Shastri National Academy of Administration to the IAS Professional Training Courses

By
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With appendices on Communal Riots
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PREFACE

One of the most challenging assignments Executive Magistrates are faced with is tackling law and order situations. Training institutions have always faced difficulty in providing standard advice to new recruits on this subject because of the paucity of relevant and rich experience combined with the ability to translate it into concepts for the classroom among the faculty.

Fortunately, in the early 1980s Shri Suresh C. Vaish IAS (1960, UT) joined the LBS National Academy of Administration as its Joint Director. He had considerable and varied experience of tackling law and order situations of different types in Delhi and in Manipur. More importantly, he could conceptualise this experience brilliantly for transmitting to the Officer-Trainees in the IAS Professional Courses.

My own experience of dealing with law and order situations and that of some of my colleagues validated Shri Vaish’s concepts. It is appropriate that they should be made available to Executive Magistrates in West Bengal so that they can take advantage of the sound guidance offered in these lectures.

The presentation is given point-wise under each topic in summary form, and, in some cases, the detailed lecture has also been reproduced.

Before Shri Vaish’s tenure, the subject used to be covered by Dr. Naresh C. Saxena, IAS (1963, UP), then Deputy Director (Sr.) who subsequently became Director of the LBSNAA, then Secretary of the Rural Development Ministry, finally Member-Secretary of the Planning Commission and is now a member of the
National Advisory Council. He had developed a specialisation in the extremely sensitive and complicated area of communal riots that is rare indeed. His paper on the subject supplements Shri Vaish’s lecture. Three excellent analyses of communal riots by Asghar Ali Engineer are also appended as live instances.

June 2005

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On Use of Force for Maintenance of Law and Order

Guidelines

In my various lectures to you and in my discussions with you I had been talking to you on use of force. How the complexion, the quantum, the timing keeps changing according to the situation you are handling and the client you are hitting at. Today I will deal only with use of force, *per se*; that is, let us forget what led to the transaction and you are about to use force. There are certain guidelines, which you will observe in using this force:

1. Firstly, the use of force on unarmed citizens of this country is a very grave decision. It is not to be taken lightly. By use of this force, you will injure people, you will kill people.

2. Secondly, as a servant of the state you will be accountable for it. In a democracy, you will have to render account either to the superiors, or to the legislature, or to a commission of inquiry. That is only but right.

3. You will use force only for protection of public life and public property. You will not use it for individual interest. If there is a danger to one man, if there is a danger to one’s property, it is an IPC case to be dealt through the FIR, a criminal case.

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1 LBSNAA, Mussoorie, talk delivered on 9.7.1982
4. When you use force, you will observe two further criteria.

(i) You will use force as last resort and
(ii) then you will use the minimum quantum of force necessary in that particular situation.

The Commission of Inquiry, and I have faced nine of them, they will hold you to these two criteria: did you use force as last resort and did you use minimum amount of force?

1. When not to use force

There are certain categories of people on whom you will not use force. Because if you do, the press, the public, the government will not support you.

1.1 You will not use force on women and children – whatever the provocation. I have faced a lot of women mobs. In Imphal, the Nupilan, the women are the more aggressive people. You don’t beat them. Form a human cordon – take the beating, they cannot beat you much. If you have to disperse them, there are other ways than use of lathis, bullets and tear gas.

Once I remember in Delhi I had to disperse a mob of women, respectable women, in an anti-price agitation. In the month of December a fire tender hosing them works wonders. You cannot stand drenched and in open in December of Delhi – you will catch pneumonia. Secondly, no lady stands in public drenched. She takes cover and changes. Also, if it is a mixed mob and often there are mixed mobs, specially students etc., try to get them out of the way, before you hit that mob. Warn it, tear gas it, make a mock lathi charge. Get the timid, women and children out of the way, when the hard core
is left, take the battle. You will secure advantages, you
get the women and children out of the way and, let me
assure you, in a mob not everybody wants a fight. A very
large number of them are there for the *tamasha* of it.
And if by these preliminary measures, the mob of 2,000
– 3,000 has become 1,000 or 500, you have improved the
odds in your favour.

1.2 *You will also not use force on physically handicapped.* We all remember the public reaction when
the Delhi police beat up the blind. Of course, the police
had provocation. The blind with their sticks were hitting
the police cordon that day. But you can’t hit back. You
take the beating and stand it.

1.3 Thirdly, *you will not use force against men of religion,* the sadhus, the priests, etc. Now, I say men of
religion. I mean religious. I do not mean the Akali-
Nirankari dispute. There is very little religion in it; there
is more politics and crime in it. I am giving you this
warning after ordering that firing on sadhus at
Parliament house. That was a different thing altogether.
You will not use force on men of religion.

1.4 *You will not use force when force is not a solution to the problem.* It happens quite often. I told you, in
Sahadra Sub-Inspector Bakshis Singh shot Niranjan
Singh, Home Guard and entered a dacoity case. The
people revolted. One after another, four battalions of
CRPF were thrown into Sahadra and the people fought at
pitched battle. It was only when the battalions were
pulled out and Bakshish arrested for murder and his
house set on fire, then the people observed peace.
Now death in police custody, rape, police atrocity, these inflame public tempers so much if you throw in force in these situations, you will only aggravate the situation, and you will not solve it.

1.5 *Do not use force when you cannot control its consequences.* Very often, it happens—and that is the worst situation—that public order has been disturbed, you have the force at your command, but because of certain restraints you cannot use it.

I will give you an example. It was a Baisakhi evening of the Manipuris; all the women had dressed up in their fineries and come out in bazaar. The time was 6.00 p.m. One truck driver molested a Manipuri lady in the bazaar. The Manipuri don’t stand for it; it immediately started a flash riot. I got the message in my home. I took the CRP guards that were guarding my house and reached the bazaar. I found the whole bazaar, which has a Chandni Chowk atmosphere and is a built-up area, was filled with people who had come for shopping that day. They were in corridors, on roofs and alleys and the mob was indulging in loot and arson. Within an hour, I had enough force there to use force upon this mob; but how do you shoot in that area? If you shoot, how to control it? Who will be killed in such a mob? There were three cinema halls in that small road. A stampede in the cinema hall and it is the women and children who get killed. Who will be responsible for that? Shoot a bullet into a heavily built-up area. You do not know the ricochets. You do not know who will be killed. That day we tolerated arson and loot and a bit of stabbing for 2½ hours before we could get enough force in to garrison it physically such that violence stopped. But we didn’t use
force. Because we could not control the consequences of that force. Of course, there was a tremendous hue and cry, especially by the shopkeepers, that the DM watched it for three hours, and we defended ourselves.

2. “Political” interference

I told you in one lecture do not complain about political interference in a law and order situation. All law and order situations, per se, are political situations. You have to handle them within the political parameter made available to you. Quite often, a situation is technically handled correctly but if the political parameters go wrong, that situation ends up in a mess.

2.1 Now, let me give you three types of situations you can get into.

2.1.1 Firstly, the source of trouble is far away, you do not know what is happening there. Your merely take the fall out. It is like a railway men’s strike. You are sitting in an outlying district / sub-division. You get a number of messages from Delhi what to do. You will have no option but to carry out because you have no local information. It can happen in a postal strike, central government employees strike. It happened in the sixties in the Hazratbal riot. Something happened in Kashmir and the whole country took the fall out. In a situation like this there is nothing wrong in abiding with government orders, telling the Commission that I had no information of mine, it was an all India situation, and I tackled it like this. The Commission will accept it.

2.1.2 Second is the type of the situation where the government orders given to you tally with your own perception and this is the most frequent case. Now here
there is no contradiction. Handle the situation but, when you are asked for accountability, say clearly that ‘I was satisfied. It was my judgment’. Do not fall back on government orders. They did tally with your judgment but the statute says that you will use force on your personal satisfaction.

2.1.3 The third type of situation, which does happen sometimes, and it has happened to me thrice, is where government orders are totally contradictory to your assessment of the situation and your judgment of handling it. If you come across such a situation, there is only one solution. Quietly, in anonymity, offer to hand over charge. That is the only option open to you. If you disobey these government orders, they will restrict your resources, they will speak directly to the police. You cannot function. If you go along with government orders and the situation ends up in a mess, you cannot stand up before a Commission and say, against my better judgment I acted on government orders.

Now what will happen if you offer to handover? If government accepts your offer, you hand over charge. That is best for you. Let the dirty work be done by someone else, I won’t do it. But they cannot easily accept your offer to handover. Three times I made this offer but they did not take me up. But then, they will watch you. If the situation ends up in a mess, you have imposed your judgment on government and they will hang you by the nearest tree and this is fair enough. If you pull out well, they will forgive you grudgingly. Well, these are the rules of the game.
3. Riots

Then the riots. You can classify various types: -

3.1 One is a flash riot; eve-teasing, cinema hall fight, traffic accident case—nobody can plan for them. Reach the spot at once, make the best bargain you can of that situation. It is your nerve, your command and control, your self-confidence that will count that day.

3.2 Second type is a situation building up, there is an announced demonstration, and there is an announced picketing or strike building up. Then be on the spot and keep a watch on your conduct and demeanour. That is the personality you are projecting to the mob, to your subordinate magistrates and the police force. Because command and control over men in such a situation does not come from a few sentences of the Cr.P.C. It comes from your physical presence there, your conduct there.

3.2.1 You will carry with you as DM either an asset or a liability of your reputation. You will get a district charge after 6 to 8 years of service and, by that time, you will be known in your cadre. If you are known as a bungalow-office officer, if you are known as politically aligned officer if you are known as an officer who passes the buck, do not expect the subordinate magistracy or police to obey you fully this reputation will reach in advance of you. But if it is known that you are willing to reach the spot, take the decision and take the rap, you will get obedience. Because as I said, this is an area in which there is no contradiction between the magistracy and the police. The police will be quite happy that the magistrate reaches the trouble spot in time, takes the decision and takes the rap later on. It is a very dirty
business. Lots of people get hurt and injured nobody wants the responsibility.

3.2.2 When giving the order to use force at that time, you will consult your subordinate magistrates, you will consult the police, you will consult Army if they are there. But it is merely consulting. After they have their say, you have to give the decision and at that time you will be a very lonely man. It often happened to me in Imphal. In a riot situation, Brig. Dunn had his say, Quinn DIG had his say, my magistrates had their say and then they kept looking at me. Now give your orders. It is an area of subjective decision-making. Later on, you cannot fall back and say Dunn told me this and Quinn told me that. You have to say I was satisfied. At that time don’t expect any support from your seniors and people above. I have had a lot of advice thrown at me when the situation is brewing from the IG, the Home Secretary, from the Chief Secretary. But once the ‘mar peet’ starts. I found that nobody is available in the office. You telephone them, if you can. The PS says that Sahib is not there. You send a wireless message; the operator says that there is no receiver at that time. So start with the presumption that you are standing on your own two feet in front of that mob and later on in front of that Inquiry Commission.

3.3 Evidence

Now before you use force, try to build up the evidence. As I said, you will be accountable for this use of force. The evidence build up is of various types.

3.3.1 You are facing the mob, they are pelting you with stones, and constables are going down with injury. Make
an arrangement that each injured constable is lifted and sent to hospital. Keep a proper ASI in that hospital to see that the medical reports are entered properly, the name, date, place, timing and the type of the injury. The type of injury is very important. Often, when the injury is entered slip-shod, the defence in the Commission says that it is not a stone injury, it is an accidental injury. If your police force was stabbed that day, the injury report should clearly read: “By a sharp edged weapon”. If not, you cannot establish in the Commission that your force was stabbed that day. So the evidence you lead in the Commission that this was the force used upon you before you retaliated should tally with the injury reports. Secondly, when these mar peets take place, a lot of public and private transport is hit. In such a situation, get the numbers of those vehicles, put them in the FIR. Because later on if you tell the Commission that 5 cars were damaged and these are the numbers, they often say that you have bought the drivers.

3.3.2 I mentioned to you that day, at Windsor Place, when after the lathi charge I picked up 78 fractured boys of the Delhi University. Now for that Commission of Inquiry, there were two allegations against me. Firstly, I used force too much and, Secondly, why did I beat the boys when they were running away. As I told you, when they started running away, they were chased and 20 more were injured. Now I told you the provocation for the lathi charge that day was two coca-cola trucks that got into the mob. The FIR dictated at Tughlak Road Thana mentioned the truck numbers and the names of the drivers. The Commission believed it because a few sentences in the FIR carry more weight than tones of oral
evidence led later on. Oral evidence does not carry that much weight. The students lost this point.

3.3.3 Secondly, they argued why did I beat the boys when they were going up the streets. Now when one group of boys was going up the Sunheri Bagh Road, they had pelted stones at a DTC bus driving by, I had seen the glass splintered. I had seen the passengers injured. I had dropped off a constable at it and I had told him get the bus number, the driver’s name and the names of the injured. Now to defend myself on this charge I put on the witness stand an old illiterate woman of about 50-55. The glass had splintered, one splinter had got into her eye, and she had been operated upon. With her eye bandaged, she told the Commission in broken Hindi that she had gone to the bazaar to buy 

*sabji*, she was coming back, and she does not know what happened. A stone came through the bus window, the glass splintered, she got her eye injured and whether this eye will function, she will know only after the bandage is taken out. Now this old woman giving this evidence, the case of the students went out of the court. She was believed more by the Commission than by any smart lawyer. And I could tell the Commission if this is what the boys were doing while dispersing. I was entitled to hit them and disperse them faster. Though it meant 20 more fractures that day.

3.3.4 There will be one inherent contradiction when the mob is facing you and beating, you and you have to decide the **timing of use of force**. The police want to go in early, naturally, because they are taking the beating. You will want to restrain them to the farthest limit so that you build up the evidence that your hitting-back was justified.
Now what is the right point, I cannot give you. It differs from situation to situation. But keep a watch. If you hold back too long, two things can happen. A police force under attack either it can go out of control and become a mob and hit the crowd like a mob not like a police force. I have seen it happen. Secondly, what can happen if the force just runs away? They take the beating for some time and suddenly the force disintegrates and they run away. As a magistrate, you have to take stock how long these men can be commanded and controlled. It is no use saying that I was waiting a little more and the police force disintegrated. It will be a part of your decision to see that you use the police force so long, as it is a police force.

4. Tear gas, lathi charge

4.1 As I told you in one of the lectures, when you enter the report, the FIR, it will very sanctimoniously read that the mob was there, you gave an oral warning over the mike or the megaphone, then you ordered tear gas, then you ordered lathi charge and then you opened fire. All reports read like that. They have to read like that. But sometimes the events do not permit it. The sequence of events seldom follows this in actual practice.

4.2 But my advice to you is that do try to tear-gas a mob before you use lathi on it, for many reasons. Firstly, if there are women and children in the mob, get them out of the way by good tear-gassing. Secondly, in a mob everybody there is not for a fight. A lot of people are there for tamasha. Once you start tear-gassing, the timid leave. I have had mobs of 3,000 or 4,000 come down to 1,000. You have improved the odds in your favour. There is one more advantage of good tear-
gassing before lathi charge. A mob is a hard-packed thing. If you lathi charge in the front you are injuring people in the front. But if the mob is packed they have no way to run away. People at the back are holding them and you find that you are inflicting too heavy injury in the front. If you tear gas it, the mob becomes soft. There are open gaps in between and when you throw the lathi at them, they disperse quite easily.

4.3 Then, when you are organizing this lathi charge, ensure that you cover the entire frontage of the mob. I have known occasions when a small group of policemen have lathi charged into the mob, the mob opened up and let them in an then mob closes behind them and lynches them. Once a man in uniform is lynched by a mob, the police force will disintegrate. See that the lathi line covers the entire frontage of the mob and between two lathi men you need four feet of space to wield the lathi properly. So do not give a snap order of lathi charge; see that it is organized properly. Now, how many lathis to throw at the mob depends on the fighting strengthen of the mob and the depth of the mob but be prepared for injuries. Injuries that result from a lathi charge can average one fracture to a lathi to three fractures to a lathi. These are the proportions you can get depending upon the contact of the lathi charge on the mob. If the mob stands and fights, you might get three injuries to a lathi. If the mob runs away or is running away and the contact is casual, you will get one fracture to a lathi.

5. Firing

5.1 After the lathi charge, when you come to firing, take one precaution. You will have four riflemen or ten riflemen under a sub-inspector with you. Establish direct
contact with that sub-inspector. Tell him that you are the magistrate on duty. He will keep a watch on you and you will give that order of firing. Your command over the firing squad should be direct.

5.2 Secondly, when you do have to fire, see that your rifles are at safe distance; that when the firing starts, the mob cannot rush at them and overwhelmed them. This safe distance is anywhere between 75 to a 100 yards. Keep that distance between the mob and your firing squad.

5.3 Thirdly, disengage the lathi police before firing. This is a difficult operation which takes time and delays firing.

5.4 When you are firing, don’t fire a volley into the mob. Put in one bullet at a time. The reason is that it is only the frontage of the mob which sees the causalities falling. People at back can hear the gunshot only. Now give them time to react, give them time to run away. If you tell your four riflemen to fire a round each, you will have four dead and the people at back might hear one gun-shot. Now how many rounds you will order depends on the mob. I told you that day that to disperse those 1,00,000 audience of the Prime minister, we went up to 9 bullets and nine dead. But at 100 yards with five minutes interval, we kept putting the bullets into the mob till they dispersed. As I have told you earlier also, before you either use the lathi or the bullet, make sure that the mob has a route of dispersal and an avenue of dispersal and that they are not hemmed in.
6. Casualties

6.1 After the use of force is over, look after the casualties. Pick up the casualties as far as possible because these casualties if in the hands of the mob, can be very embarrassing evidence. Also, it is your responsibility to see that the injured after the fight received adequate medical treatment.

6.1.1 Let me give you another example. Those students of Windsor place fractured that day, we loaded them into the All India Institute of Medical Sciences. Now no casualty ward can attend to 90 fractured boys at that hour of the night, the sought the intervention of the health ministry, we got additional resources and through out the night all the boys were X-rayed, plastered and those who were in pain, were put under morphine. When the press, parents and public leaders came to the Institute next morning—the national dailies from Delhi had splashed this news—they found no student on the danger list, nobody in pain, everybody plastered. I got a particular reaction from the city and the press. But suppose this point was not covered, there were boys lined in pain, there were boys line in danger without plastered or X-ray, the city would have reacted very differently.

6.2 Apart from the injured, the dead bodies can cause you a problem. The netas after the post-mortem will try to take the dead bodies, they will try to take out a procession the next day, and you will have another mar pit on your hands. Now make an attempt that day specially with the families of the deceased, let them have a quite funeral and no tamasha the next day. Play on their sentiments that whatever the politics, your brother, your man is dead, let’s have a quiet dignified funeral,
don’t politicalize his dead body. You can adjust the timing of the release of the body after the post-mortem. You can sometimes take relatives in confidence and get it out from the rare of the hospital. But do make an attempt that the funeral procession next day does not lend to a second riot. Sometimes you will succeed, sometimes you will not, but do make that attempt.

7. Press

Also get your version in the press in time. Next morning, when it comes out in the press, there will be three versions. There will be version of the aggrieved party and their leaders. There will be the version of the eyewitness account of the press reporters who have reached the spot. There must be your official version. Because if your version comes the next day, it is lost. What strikes in people’s mind, which includes MLAs, MPs, your own seniors sitting in the Ministry is what they read in the newspaper that day first time. We had a standing drill in Delhi that one of the mandatory duties of the Magistrate who uses the force was to send the official version to the press. When the transaction occurs too late in the evening, we would ring up these national dailies, Statesman, Hindustan Times etc., and request them to keep half a column vacant for us, we would send the version and they used to abide by us.

8. F.I.R.

8.1 Then I would suggest dictate the FIR yourself. Because a few sentences in that FIR are worth tones of oral evidence led later on. The Commission of inquiry, the Government, the parliamentary debate, all begin with FIR. If you leave it to a thanedar, or an inspector or a
junior magistrate, he does not first have that command over English to introduce the finer nuances in the sentences on which you will rely later on. Secondly, he does not understand what will be the major defences of yours when you face the Commission.

8.2 As I told you, if you are on the spot, you have taken the decision and you are willing to take the responsibility, there will be no conflict between the police and you in dictating this FIR. They will be quite happy to let you dictate the FIR and be accused number one in the commission of inquiry that follows.

8.3 Also when you are giving this accountability either to government or to a commission of inquiry, do not try to rely upon your seniors. I have had a lot of advice thrown at me before the ‘marpeet’ started. The moment the ‘marpeet’ starts, and you try to contact your DM, or commissioner or home secretary or chief secretary, they are just not there. That is the standard practice. Also what happens is whatever the advice you got, the statute says that you will use force to your personal satisfaction. In the commission how do you turn around and say that the home secretary told me this on telephone. You are putting your case out of the court. Also, when you give a story before a commission it has to be a consistent story.

9. Evidence

9.1 Now what you will find you can polish the course of events of that day but you substantially cannot change the course of events. The reason is the lots of collateral evidence building up around you, beyond your control, when this ‘marpeet’ takes place and if you try to distort the course of events substantially, you will get caught.
Now this collateral evidence builds up in a lot of way. The constables are getting injured and going to the hospital. The casualty ward will enter the time of reporting. The timing of the transaction is fixed. The injury report will say what type of an injury, blunt instrument, sharp edged instrument, fire arm, etc. Now that will tie down the story of what weapon was used on you. Also in a public fight very often there are eminent public people watching it that the commission will believe them, he might be a retired government servant or retired judge or retired professor. These people are believed by the commission because they are not a part of the fight, they are third party witnesses.

9.2 Also, when you are taking this street fight, a lot of police wireless messages are flying and these messages are in a number of copies. They go to various offices and they are produced before the commission. Often they will strip you up if you try to tell them a blatant lie. I can tell you what happened in Turkman gate inquiry. When the Shah Commission was taking evidence, a whole lot of senior Delhi police officers denied they were ever there. Because it was after 2 ½ years that then a very sharp investigator produced a number of original copies of the police wireless messages of those days. That SP so and so reached the spot. DIG so and so reached. He ordered the firing. He ordered this and that. All that was going on police wireless net.

9.3 Another thing can happen. Somebody might have taken a photograph. Now you cannot keep a watch on everybody. Quite often when photographs are taken we do not like it. The pressman’s camera accidentally gets damaged. It does happen but how much can you cover
everything. Be prepared that somebody has taken a photograph and will produce it. Let me give you another example. A very senior officer of government was asked in the Shah Commission that did you take out all the employees of your office and parade them in June, 1975. He denied it. He thought that he had covered his track completely. But unfortunately for him, a sharp investigator remembered that all these demonstrations were photographed and published in the press. We went to the DAVP library where these negatives are kept. They are kept in thousands and nobody pays attention to them. He took out the relevant negatives and prepared the blow-ups. Next day when the officer came to the commission, he found them all put on the wall. Now do not let that happen to you, that you deny something and suddenly the next day the commission has full photograph of you doing the same thing.

9.4 Now give cover to your men. People asked me batch after batch that why don’t you tell the truth to a commission. The reason is that no ‘marpeet’ situation is totally straight. There are a lot of rough edges to it and you have to polish them. You have ordered one platoon to lathi charge and two platoons ran in and used their lathis. Do you tell the commission that one platoon was not under orders? You ordered two rounds and three rounds were fired and three people killed. Do you put the third constable on charge? You cannot do that; you have to cover up. That is why you cannot tell the truth to the commission.
10. De-escalate

10.1 Also I would suggest to you that apart from your official accountability to a senior, to the legislature, to the commission of inquiry, de-escalate with the people. Don’t let the bitterness last too long. Because you cannot survive that way. Now times have changed. You are living in times that one ‘marpeet’ and you will be transferred. But our times were different. Four years as ADM in the New Delhi district and four years DM, Imphal, you cannot repeatedly keep using force and let that resentment build up the other sides. After every ‘marpeet’ I found it advisable to have a dialogue with the other party, to talk it over with them to examine what happened that day, how could it be avoided, what were the rough edges. I always did this with the AMSU (All Manipuri Students Union) which were the contending party at the other end. After every ‘marpeet’ I would have a dialogue and I asked them, you try to fault me on these two grounds. Did I not use force as last resort that day and secondly, was it not the minimum amount of force used. And we used to have long talks over it. And that is how some of us in my generation could survive four years in a district. So as a professional, outside your duty, de-escalate with the people you hit. It can be done and should be done.

10.2 Regarding your personal conduct in all these things, do not bear a personal grudge. You are hitting at people, they will hit back at you. There is nothing personal about it. They have broken my arm, they have broken my leg, I have taken three stitches in my head, I have been shot at but it is a part of official business.
10.3 Secondly, I would suggest do not do this job for more than 2-3 years at a stretch. There is a reason for it. It draws upon you tremendously as a human being. I have seen young officers coming to Imphal getting, into counter-insurgency operation. Some of them mentally broke down. Some of them physically broke down. Gogoi, IPS, 1964, Assam, had one year of this job and he blew his own brains out. Brig. Sharma told me the other day that one of his soldiers picked up his sten gun and massacred three of his own men in the barrack. So do not strain yourself on this job beyond a limit.

10.4 Thirdly, if you are doing this job, see that you are in good health. Because this work makes tremendous physical demands upon you. For days you might not have proper sleep, you might be on your feet for hours and hours. And I have known a lot of errors of judgement because of tiredness, because of fatigue and because of just ill health. If you are in poor health, do not take up this work.

10.5 And lastly, the reason to keep it limited is courage. You see, do not be ashamed if you feel fear in such a situation. I have felt a tremendous amount of fear in this dirty work. Fear is the normal human reaction to danger. But courage, I may define negatively. *Courage is how you control your fear.* And this is not inherent to anybody. It comes out of practice. That is why in shorter groups I have been advising you that in September, when you take charge of a sub-division, you will have a lot of time on your hands. Whenever there is violence, there are demonstrations, keep going to the spot. Get the feel of how mobs form, how the police behaves, how this conflict takes place and over years by practice, you will
learn to control fear. And you will be called a courageous man. But again there is a time frame for it. There was a medical study during the II world war called Anatomy of courage. This study was done by Lord Moran and his team of medical men. The study was ordered by allied armies because they found that after Normandy some of the best troops of the allied armies were running away. They were quite worried about this situation and this study was instituted. This study came to the conclusion that in every human being there is limited stock of courage. If you keep making repeated demands upon it, the stock is expendable. No man can be courageous all the time for unlimited time. As I told you, 2-3 years is the maximum for this work. Not only for yourself, keep watching the men under you. If particular battalions, if particular magistrates are deployed on this work for too long under you, it will be advisable for you to tell government that a rotation is necessary. Or something like Brig. Sharma told you would happen. People get sick they break down.
1. I had told you that I will deal with maintenance of essential services separately. There were two reasons for it. Firstly, in an industrial dispute your mandate is to protect public life and property. It is none of your business whether that factory works or it is shut down. But in essential services, electricity, water supply, scavenging, food, medical cover, it is also your responsibility that these services will be restored as soon as possible. This responsibility rests upon you because in any civic area where these services are disturbed and continue to be disturbed, if they are not restored within a reasonable time, all public order will be collapsed. There will be no government left in these areas. This responsibility will devolve upon you in two capacities, either you might be an officer of the local body on deputation, commissioner of a corporation, chairman of a municipality whatever the position. The second source of this responsibility is that even as a district magistrate or a sub-divisional officer, you will have to tackle this situation such that the services are restored as soon as possible. Now when this objective is given to you, your handling of this situation becomes very different from handling a strike in a factory.

2. The sources of trouble with workers in essential services are many. With increasing urbanization, these essential services have become capital intensive, the

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2 Lecture delivered on 21.7.1982 at the LBSNAA, Mussoorie
water works, the electric sub-stations, the mechanized transport for removing urban wastes, the hospitals, etc. And these workmen now realize their power that they can bring a city to a standstill. Knowing this power and striking repeatedly over the last two decades, they have pushed up their wages at an extremely high level considering the wages in the rest of the sectors, and they have reached a point whether the capacity to pay is being nearly exhausted. Wages of those people come from municipal taxes and for your information, municipal tax in this country has reached almost 40 per cent of rent. A landlord who realizes Rs.100/- as rent has to pay 40 percent to the municipality for municipal services. He gets in his pocket only 60 percent and from that he pays his income tax, maintenance, etc. In this context, there can be no major increase in their wages and yet these people know their indispensability. The country today, it is short of artisans, electricians, masons, plumbers, etc. IAS officers are cheaper by the dozen. They can easily be replaced not these people.

3. To give you an example when we had that storm in Mussoorie in May 1981, all the roofs were blown away, people were killed, the windows panes fell in. The wages of a carpenter in this city went up to Rs. 60/- a day, Rs.1800/- a month tax free, and you could not get a carpenter for asking. You had to go town Landour where they live, beg and cajole him and I have seen house owners bringing them in their own car to get their houses repaired. So, they realize their power. But they have grievances and genuine grievances on two grounds. Firstly, most of these essential services are under local bodies and the administration and man management of
local bodies is very poor. Their confirmation, increment, efficiency bar, etc. are often in a state of mess, and when this accumulates too much those body of men got restless. Secondly, as they are under municipal authorities, they are in very small cadres and their promotional channels are very restricted. I have seen wiremen for 20-25 years. He joined as a plumber and retired as a plumber. This is no way of managing men. Some channels of promotion, some channels of advancement has to be built up for them. It is not only we I.A.S. who can operate the Parkinson’s’ Law that all of us become Joint Secretaries. These will be their legitimate grievance when they come to bargain with you before a strike or after a strike.

4. As I have mentioned to you in all these lectures, in the Internal Security Scheme, there is a chapter now on maintenance of essential services. Up-date this chapter. Find out in this chapter how far the data is given in it is correct because this chapter will provide that in case of strike in these units, you will draw help from other bodies. They are the state PWD, the CPWD, the armed forces and also quite often, in large metropolitan areas, the local development authority. There are two different bodies, one is old municipal body and then is the development authority, like the DDA in Delhi, CMDA in Calcutta. See how far the facts and figures tally, are they valid to day and again have your trial runs. But when you are falling back on these other bodies to give you technical help, keep in your mind the trade union equations. Normally, they are under different unions and there is no love lost between various unions- the union of a municipal body and the union of a development body.
But if the union is the same, if the leadership is the same, to that extent, you will have to be prepared that union will not come to your help, your calculation of manpower will go wrong. I had told you in the earlier lecture that immediately refer the dispute to the labour court. The reason is that the armed forces come to your help under their Act of 1947. That Act has two pre-requisites before they can help you in maintenance of essential services. Firstly, the strike should be declared illegal. Secondly, you will give a certificate that you have exhausted all civil resources available to you. Earlier we used to declare this strike illegal under the Maintenance of Essential Services Act, which lapsed in 1974. I do not know what are the acts in various states, but only central act available to you now to declare a service essential is the Industrial Dispute Act of 1947. Refer this case to the labour court, if they go on strike during adjudication, under the labour law declare it illegal. This declaration of illegality is a scrap of paper, it has coercive value, and it is a statement of fact. But that scrap of paper is needed by the army to come your help. Often when you miss this out and at the last moment you ask the army, they will not come to your help, they cannot, they are not covered by their act.

5. Also, when you want help from these outside agencies do alert them in time. These other agencies, like C.P.W.D., army, etc., they have a lot of manpower, but their technical hands are of very limited and very scattered. It takes them a long time to deploy these technicians. To give you an example, in the electricity strike of NDMC in 1978, to provide 60 electrical technicians, the army had to lift them from Haryana to
Allahabad to Rajasthan. From this area they could collect 60 technicians and it took them 48-72 hours to do it. If you give them advance notice, they keep making their calculations, they keep locating their men and movement time and they come to you much faster. C.P.W.D is better provided but they have their problems. Secondly, when they come to your assistance, they are just technically trained people. They do not know your network, they do not know your system and if you have no papers ready to guide them, it will take them 2-3 days to understand your system. The Internal Security Scheme provides that for electricity, water and all these, you will have the charts, you will have the blueprints, you will also have an explanatory note, which will be intelligible to a technically trained man that, if given to him, he can study it and move into your system. Keep this ready in advance, it will save you around 48-72 hours when these people come to your help. Also these strikes occur at the workers level, they go up to junior engineers level generally. The problem arises how to get work out of the senior officers, the executive engineers, superintending engineers and above. They have a genuine problem. If they actively and enthusiastically break the strike later on when the strike is over and they go back to work in the plant, they will be a single man with hundreds of workers. They are afraid of beaten up, they are afraid of being lynched. When I used to talk to the senior engineers, we used to come to an understanding that, collusively, I will make such a show of force against them that it will be their alibi when they go back to work with their men. For instance, in the electricity strike of New Delhi, collusively I served a show cause notice of
dismissal on Chief Engineer downwards, and also arrested one engineer. They nominated the men and I arrested him. When the strike was over, these senior engineers went to their workmen and said what could we do? That fellow was bent upon dismissing and he was arresting us. If we had not come to work he would have arrested more. A similar thing was done for the water supply strike of MCD in the next year 1979. People were suspended, show cause notices were given. Do understand their difficulty. An Assistant Engineer in a water works is there with 500 workmen, these strikes happen every now and then, and if tension mounts, he will get beaten up and killed. It has happened.

6. Then when you are working with very short staff, you have to ensure that you get the maximum out of them. And let me assure, you need a very little staff. 2000 employees in the NDMC electricity branch, we run the services with about 400 odd men for 10 days. There are 6000 employees in the water works of MCD. In the time of strike, there were about 700 men working and with this short body of men we could attain a supply of 70-80%. When you are working these men hard, the shortage of manpower can be made up by mobility. Give them transport. This is easier said than done. You will have to withdraw in your area all transport and put it to this business. This leads to a lot of time bad blood. In both these strikes, which I handled, the only vehicles we left in the Delhi Administration was one with the Lt. Governor and one with the Chief Secretary. The rest were withdrawn. My colleagues raised a tremendous hue and cry that my staff car is taken away. Officers tend to very touchy about it. Then the second source of trouble
happens. You make your men mobile not only for working on the roads but also to take them home, bring them from home, take them for food, so that their travelling time is reduced, you can get that man to work more and one colleague of mine, who is a couple of years senior to me, when he found that his staff car was at the disposal of 4 khalasis and staff car was fetching them from home, dropping them home, he was livid with rage. But you will have to take that flak. Also, these strikes last 7-10 days i.e. because they just cannot last more. The short body of men that you are using, see that they can last out for this time. In the water strike, there was a superintending engineer named Misra, who had been in the Wazirabad water station for donkey’s years, emotionally attached to it. When the strike happened, he worked 48 hours non-stop and collapsed an old man of 50. I pulled up Misra for it. I said this is no way of handling a strike and you in a breakdown the condition are of no use. Watch their hours of work, their food, their sleep, and spread it out such that they will work for 10 days that they can hold out. It might mean that restoration instead of 2 days takes 3 days. It might mean that instead of 80% service you restore only 70% service. But keep these calculations in mind and take a trade off. Do not breakdown these men. This much is for restoration.

7. Now you come to sabotage. The sabotage occurs at two levels. Firstly before these people go on strike, they will do extensive sabotage. When the water people went on strike they knocked out 3 pumps at Wazirabad, they jammed the other water station at Chandrawal and then they struck work. The electricity people of New Delhi,
before they went on strike, they jumbled all keys, short-circuited the various fuse boxes. They jumbled the various lines. They destroyed the various charts and then they stopped work. Also they selected 5 people to hit whom they did not like. There was Sri Kidar Nath Sahni, the Chief Executive Councillor, Sri K.L. Advani, the leader of Delhi ruling party, Mr. Raj Narayan they did not like, there was one more person and myself because I had been bargaining with them. Before going on strike, they messed up these 4 houses that their circuits were so fouled that nobody could restore them. My house they could not get at because I was living in a flat of Chanakyapuri. There are 500 flats there. The team, which came to jumble my house, they did not know the house number. They loitered around a bit in the colony discreetly trying to find out where I lived, and they could not find it out and it became 6 p.m., the strike period, so they left. And that is the advantage of anonymity. I got the electricity throughout the strike period. My advice to you is when this situation is precipitating, move the armed police closes to these stations, the local police stations, the local police lines and put them on alert and when the strike is precipitating move in and take possession of these vital installations. Because if you get a heavily sabotage system, your burden of restoring services in the strike condition with outside help becomes very arduous. Now it is a matter of judgment. You can be accused that you moved in too early and precipitated the strike. If you moved in too late, too much sabotage takes place they hold you guilty again. The judgment is subjective and my advise to you is, err on side of safety. Move in quickly stop this sabotage.
Apart from the initial sabotage, when you are restoring these services, the workers will be on the lose, they know the system, they know where to hit and they will be sabotaging. Here, you will run up against a tremendous problem because all these services are so spread out, you will never have enough uniformed manpower to guard the system. To give you an example, the electricity supply of New Delhi, 45 Sq. Km area, it comes into 3 stations of 66 KV, about 10 stations of 33 KV, about 30-35 stations of 11 KV and from there it goes into two-and-half thousand pillar boxes. You have seen those squat boxes of grey colour on the roads of New Delhi, mostly they are on the back lanes. But for New Delhi alone there are two-and-half thousand of them, and each pillar-box gives 11 collections. How do you guard them? Where is the manpower? The water supply main lines of Delhi they measure I am told 1200 miles. Now here we lay a system that as far as your central installations are concerned, water supply, stations and 66 to 11 kv electricity stations, put them under static armed guard, give them a clear parameter and if a mob comes within the parameter shoot. There is no other alternative because if the 66 KV station goes, if Wazirabad and Chandrawal goes, you have had it, the service will collapse. Now below that, lay a strong mobile patrol, armed uniform mobile patrol to guard these spread installations. Even that will not be enough. Delhi has a very strong civil defence and home-guard organization, and in all these crises, flood, fire, war, two wars I have seen there, these strikes we always called the civil defence organization, and home guards for help. These are bodies of volunteers. They are not government
employees, they are not grade III and grade IV. Handle them properly, handled them with courtesy, they can give you tremendous help. The manpower here is very large. Also, there is an identity of interest between you and them in such a situation when there is electricity, water and other strike. As citizens they want these services restored, but handled them properly. If the strike persists even go below these home guards and civil defence for instance, by the fifth day of electricity strike we had formed the mohalla committees in New Delhi, we had shown them their lines and pillar-boxes. This box supplies electricity to these 11 houses, now will you put a 24 hours guard on it? The citizens in their own interest, they divided the pillar-boxes among themselves, laid the manpower, and we found one person with a cot sleeping there all the time. And once I asked one of them what are you doing here? He said I am just watching this box and if anybody wants to touch it he has to show me a green card. We had issued the green cards to the workers during the strike period. If you get that kind of support from the citizens you can stop the sabotage.

8. You restore the service 70-80%, you guard against the sabotage, you lift the first-second level of leaders of this strike then what do you do? Just sit tight because once the supply is restored no labour leader will be able to hold his men to a strike position. They will come to the bargaining table. When they come to the bargaining table firstly, give them their legitimate demands. As I told you there will be quite a lot of them. Give it to them across the table. Also show your firmness that they have come begging for a settlement and not you. As I was telling the earlier class, we were petty peeved by the
water supply strike. It was totally uncalled for and after the restoration and sitting down on it, the three of us were handling it, Mahesh Buch, Virendra Prakash and myself. We gave these leaders appointment at 3.00 pm in the Link House at Bahadur Shah Zafar Marg and at 2.30 pm we went away to hotel Janpath to have high tea, and we had our high tea till 6.00 pm. We told the staff to tell them to wait. Now what could the poor labour leaders do? If they had left out our office without meeting us, their workmen, their followers were already very restless. They could not leave, so they waited. Of course our seniors were getting cold feet and making telephone calls that what are you people doing? But the three of us together were a strong force. We said we would handle it our way. We went there at 6 o’clock, gave them all their legitimate demands, but we said that we will talk to you further only when you withdraw this strike unconditionally. You give us two-line undertaking that strike is withdrawn unconditionally, and then we will talk to you further. It is very humiliating thing for them. For half-an-hour they talked. They could not go out empty handed, they signed. Having done this we set-up a team of officers, sections etc. kept taking their demand case by case, promotion, increment, confirmation, what have you, and clear it out within weeks and doing that for a body of 6,000 men required a lot of work.

9. Now at this bargaining table, your power to bargain depends upon how you handle the strike. If there has been brutality, if there has been use of unjustified force, all this will come to the bargaining table and make it difficult for you. My advice to you is that this is an area in which exercise utmost patience because your dignity,
your feeling, etc. are totally immaterial concerned to the safety and well being of a whole city. Let me give you two or three examples to what limit this forbearance has to go. I told you about the scavengers of Patel Nagar. The municipal scavengers had some brawl with a few constables and they got slapped. We knew that trouble was brewing and the SP and I moved into the Patel Nagar Police Station with 100 lathi-men. That evening, these scavengers of Patel Nagar brought 5-truck loads of refugee which they collected all the day, and threw it at the thana. Dead dogs, cats filth and what not. 100 of them hung over the wall of Patel Nagar Thana and showered the choicest abuses on us. It went on for an hour and young jat constables were going out of control, in that barrack hall where SP and I were there. They have been told to sit down, the whole body of men murmured and got up and picked up their lathis. At that point of time I thought this force had gone out of control. I told that Markande Singh, “Get out of the way, you cannot hold these men.” But Markande Singh was a proud man and he stood at the door, held it, and said, “Over my dead body”. It was a confrontation for ten minutes between his men and the SP, the constables sat down. I just wanted to stress that the SP risked his life that day because if you had beaten up these scavengers the next day the whole 6,000 under Ramrakha would have gone on strike. You would have had a bigger problem. So, tolerate it. When I had discussed these cases with Ramrakha, the leader of the scavengers—he is the most offensive abusive man you can ever deal with, and we kept talking to him for hours and hours—and came to a settlement. I remember another case of NDMC
wiremen electrocuted in course of duty and the supervisor was unsympathetic and wooden with the family of the deceased and his fellow workmen and by evening we had a strike situation in NDMC. Now this is no case to take a strike on your hands. Two hours I have bargained with these people, they were offensive and abusive and I have heard the choicest abuses that evening. They kept asking me “If it was your brother, your father who had died like this, would you people behave in this fashion?” You kept your patience, you apologise. You suspended that supervisor but you averted that strike. So keep this in mind. Government will not support you, if you have precipitated a strike in an essential service, which could have been avoided. Government will not forgive you when in handling a strike untoward incidents have happened which have made subsequent settlement difficult, because remember, there is no substitute for this body of men. After the strike they have to come back, they have to work. So when dealing with them keep that in mind.

10. Lastly what are the methods you use to break these strikes. As I said the standard situation is, restore the service 70%, stop the sabotage, then wait. But behind that a little coercion can be used. Arrest a few of the leaders. If you can divide them so much the better and the classic case was the railway strike of 1974. You remember that time there was no emergency. That strike was broken under the ordinary laws of the country. People were dismissed, people were arrested but this was not adequate. Then with the dismissal order, another order was sent evicting that man from his house. You cannot stay in Government house and fight Government.
It is not fair. If you want to fight Government find your own residence. Luckily, these railway employees live in well-defined colonies all over the country. Colony by colony these eviction orders were executed. Then it was found that they started coming back. The moment the force would leave they would break open the flat and get back. Then the next thing was tried. After evicting that man, another family was put in possession of that flat. Housing is very short. The state of satisfaction is only 40 per cent and 60 per cent are without houses. A tough family was put in possession who would guard their possession and this worked because the striker with his wife, utensils and children on the road, what will he do? He was more worried how to cook the next meal for his family, not so much for his leadership and this discouraged all the railway colonies in India. Now what is the force to be used, what will hit them, what will hurt them, it will depend from place to place, from each system-to-system. Here, let me tell you that maintenance of life and property is your statutory duty, but in essential service you have a still higher duty that these essential services be maintained. Otherwise, as I told you in the very beginning, a week or 10 days, all public order in the city will collapse, there will be no Government left.
3

Student Violence

I. The background
   a) Pre-independence involvement in freedom struggle.
   b) Post-independence – initial neglect – then R.S.S.
      leftist and congress organized their camps – now a
      political battlefield.
   c) Since 1960’s, influx of students from rural areas and
      hardening of alignments on caste and regional lines –
      their responses to force differ.

II. The Educational System
   a) Poor quality of education does not keep them in the
      classroom.
   b) For a large majority no nexus between education and
      economic security.
   c) Staff of educational institutions politicking among
      the students.
   d) Call of the political parties – heavy funding of
      elections.
   e) Examinations do not have a sobering influence – on
      the contrary they have become a flash point.

III. Two new dimensions
   a) Students assuming political leadership and making
      the establishment redundant – Gujarat in 1974, Assam in
      1980. Old responses do not work, new ones will have to
      be worked out.

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3 Phase II, 10.6.81
b) Lack of trust in establishment when their direct interests are involved – reservation issue.

IV. Precautions before an issue precipitates
a) On taking charge read up the past history of student trouble in your area.
b) Do not rely only on police intelligence reports – keep your sources of information open with students, teachers, staff and parents.
c) Meet the genuine needs of students in advance – mess, fees, transport, vacant teaching posts.
d) When there is a conflict of public interest and student interest, bring it in a sharp focus.

V. Use of Force
a) Do not use force till the last resort and build up sufficient grounds. Subsequently, govt., public and press will hold you to strict account – when used sharp and swift.
b) Make an adequate show of force – then disperse the timid.
c) Problem of entry into college campus.
d) If you can chose your time and place – do not be driven with your back to the wall.

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4

Agrarian Unrest

I. a) Cornwallis Permanent Settlement of 1793. Search of landowner. Concept of owner of land in the English sense absent both in Hindu Law and Muslim Law.
b) System of zamindars evolved by the British best suited to a colonial rule, vested interest of the landed gentry, avenue of employment to educated Indians, first line of defence of the Raj against the peasants.

b) Reform laws of early fifties, ceiling on land holdings and self-cultivation. Confrontation with the Supreme Court. After abolishing the first intermediary, the law became dormant.

III. a) Demand for labour in agriculture arises because of:
   i) peak season of sowing and harvesting, some crops like rice require more,
   ii) holdings are too large for self cultivation, also plantations,
   iii) By a caste taboo the landholder cannot self-cultivate his limited holding.
b) Productivity of land is a variable factor. When productivity is high, the size of the cake to be

\[\text{Phase II, 11.6.81}\]
divided between the landholder and labour is larger. Economic forces may push wages to the statutory minimum or above it. When productivity is low, then irreconcilable friction. Pockets of influx of outside money.

c) Organization of agricultural labour. Impact of left politics in W.Bengal and Kerala, of caste politics in Tamil Nadu.

IV. a) Armed confrontation in Telangana in Andhra, Siliguri in W. Bengal and Bihar. A sense of deprivation, political leadership, terrain, communication.

V. a) Long-term economic solutions, increase productivity of land, subsidiary rural employment outside cultivation, shift to urban employment, population control.
b) Immediate diffusion purchase time by enforcement of reform laws on the statute books. The present system of dominance of landholders buttressed by force, caste, education, political power, administrative sympathy or apathy, accepted deprivation is a very stable system, though inequitable. It has withstood the pressure of the statutes and the pious intentions of political parties.
c) Bureaucracy by itself has not been an instrument of change or enforcement of the law. External stimulus needed. Political will in Karnataka, political objective in
Kerala, fear of disorder in Andhra and Maharashtra. West Bengal an assumption that no legal way of doing it, physical distribution of land in 1967.

VI. Your responsibility as a revenue officer -
   a) Non-populist administrative approach.
   b) Drudgery of revenue cases.
   c) Inspection, touring, circuit courts.
5

Labour Agitations

I. Special features of the labour movement in India:
a) Only about 10% of the labour force is in the organized sector.
b) Due to historical circumstances, labour movement in India is an appendage of various political parties.

II. There are different models available in other countries:
a) In the West, it is organized into a political force by itself.
b) In communist countries, it is a part of government, as there is no private employer labour has no bargaining rights with the employer-state. Poland an aberration.
c) In Japan, the feudal structure has been retained and used within the industrial framework.
d) In Israel, the employer-employee relationship is overlaid by the feeling of a nation besieged.

III. Consequences of special characteristics in India:
a) No united labour movement, inter-union rivalries factional fights, political motivations.
b) Policy of confrontation and extremism dictated by the political party, these political considerations dilute ostensible labour demands.
c) Linkages and offsetting forces between money interest, political power and worker’s vote.

IV Labour situation overtime:

5 Phase II, 15.6.81
a) In the decade of fifties relative industrial peace, monolith political structure, stable prices of wage goods, increase of employment in agriculture and industry, genuine labour demands settled under the Industrial Disputes Act of 1947.

b) In the decade of sixties slower rate of growth in employment, rise in prices of wage goods, political hegemony broken in 1967, leftist government in West Bengal and militant labour front.

c) Escalation in the decade of seventies. Railway strike of 1970. Essential Services Maintenance Act lapses in 1971. Railway strike of 1974 broken a watershed. During Emergency disputes dormant. Electoral change of 1977 and consequent inter-union rivalry for power. A period of drift, economy held to ransom by organized labour in the spheres of coal, railways, ports, power. This drift cannot continue and government will have to come to grips with the labour, limitation of paying capacity.

V. Course of labour disputes:

a) Demands raised for bonus, salary, hours of work, retrenchment, labour saving device, lockout, recognition.

b) Sorting of the legality of the dispute by the labour department, time consuming, can be blocked in courts by the employer.

c) Labour reacts by demonstration, picketing, sit-in, strike, gherao: legality of these actions.

d) Equation between politics, money-power, union leader, owner, temper of workers and management comes into play.
e) Economics of profits under the present tax structure.

VI. Your involvement:
   a) Protection to public life and to property. Care in use of Sec.144 Cr. P.C.
   b) Prior involvement necessary, to be informed to diffuse to handle.
   c) Location and size of the labour force, logistics of police deployment, the terrain.
   d) Operation to cordon, to flush out, to disperse.
   e) Strike schemes for industrial areas.

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6

Maintenance of Essential Services

I. The difference from an ordinary strike situation:
a) the responsibility to protect life and property continues. Also, restoration of these essential services as soon as possible is a primary objective. Without electricity, water, scavenging, public transport, civic life and all order will collapse.
b) Your involvement will be either as the local magistrate or as an officer of the local body on deputation.

II. The background.
a) Progressive urbanization leads to investment in capital-intensive civic services such as piped water supply, electricity, mechanized collection, disposal of urban waste, motorized urban transport, etc.
b) There is no private supply of these services and men working in it have a feeling of power, a capacity to disrupt civic life. There is an overall shortage of such artisans as electricians, plumbers, fitters, heavy vehicle drivers.
c) The body of men in these essential services are already highly politicized and have pushed up their wages and perquisites.
d) Their demand for wages is restricted under two constraints the capacity of the local body/consumer to pay and the spread effect of wage-rise.
e) The complaint of lack of promotion in a restricted pyramidal organization is genuine.

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6 Phase II, 16.6.81
III. The internal security scheme has a chapter on maintenance of essential services. Check this. Government orders exist to run this scheme every six months. Do so with the complementary departments.

IV. When trouble is apprehended:
   a) Refer it to labour courts so that strike is illegal under the labour laws when resorted to.
   b) Alternate resources of other bodies such as P.W.D., Development authority, from outside the area. Union affiliations be kept in mind.
   c) Alert the armed forces, it takes them time together technicians.

V. Prevent Sabotage
   a) Now a routine to sabotage installations before striking work.
   b) Move the force to local areas in advance. Induct force in the installations and lay out patrolling before sabotage – a difficult choice of timing.

VI. Aid from armed forces.
   a) Aid to civil authorities, not provided in the Cr. P.C. but in government orders. It will be a government decision to extend aid not the decision of the local commander.
   b) Armed forces emergency duty act 1947. Two pre-requisites:
      i) Strike has been declared illegal.
      ii) All civil resources have been exhausted.
   c) The army only assists, you are still in control. They require guidance and mobility. Their conditions of work.
VII. Maintenance of the service:
   a) guidance and support to outside help—charts and system.
   b) Supervisory/gazetted staff be kept in hand if necessary by a show of coercion.
   c) Number of men required is small, increase their mobility.
   d) Time frame of 7 to 10 days, do not strain the men beyond their physical resources.
   e) Equity in distribution of skeleton services, an emotive issue, withstand V.I.P. pressure.

VIII. Protection from running sabotage:
   a) Lift the leaders at 2 or 3 levels.
   b) Static armed guards – motorized patrols on vital lines.
   c) Use home guards and civil defence. Also the local public.

IX. Restore normalcy:
   a) Having restored skeleton service, wait.
   b) Concede genuine demands, remove administrative bottlenecks.
   c) Avoid brutality, do not create martyrs among workers.
   d) Allow the labour leaders to save their face in labour courts.

X. Scavenging strike.
Your options depend on the size of the problem.

.............

Page 51 of 51
I. Causes:
   Not mono-causal. A host of causes which differ for various communities and for various regions in this country. Yet a complete explanation is not possible. Certain generalizations can be attempted:
   a) A historical legacy.
   b) A search for identity and preservation.
   c) Romantic mischievous literature.
   d) Often an underlying economic conflict.

II. Characteristics:
   a) Leads to a society divided on vertical not horizontal lines.
   b) Urban-based led by middle class.
   c) Fear psychosis among the mass of uneducated poor.

III. Conditions pre-requisite to violence:
   a) The minority is substantial in number.
   b) The minority has a large component of uneducated poor.
   c) There is a general perception of deprivation.
   d) Presence of a sub-elite group, obscurantist in outlook, with a vested interest in perpetuating the system.
   e) A fascist group willing to fight for nirvana.

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7 Phase II, 18.6.81
IV. Political adjustments:
   a) Growth of localized parties on communal lines.
   b) These parties have a front, the storm troopers do not make a good election – candidates.
   c) Even the national parties make adjustments of convenience.

V. Resort to violence:
   a) More often the minority start the violence, then suffer the backlash of the majority community.
   b) Speed of change creates adverse circumstance and a psychosis of fear.
   c) The dominant class resists any change in the status quo.
   d) Often the timing is political.
   e) Inflammatory press and rumour mongering.

VI. Course of violence:
   a) Flash points, land, worship, housing, women.
   b) Traditional flash points of an area have a legal background which can be gleaned from the files.
   c) The musclemen on both the sides are well known. They should be picked up.
   d) The course of violence, mob formations, points of collection of men and weapons, arsenals for making weapons have a repetitive pattern.

VII. What can you do:
   a) If possible, pre-empt the trouble.
   b) If it erupts, swift use of force and preventive clampdown.
c) If trouble beyond that, evacuation, guarded camps and supplies.

d) Prevent looting.

e) Peace committees of various communities.

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Use of Armed Forces for maintenance of law and order

I. Four types of assistance:
   a) maintenance of law and order.
   b) maintenance of essential services.
   c) assistance during natural calamity.
   d) other types of assistance, development projects.

II. Section 130 Code of Criminal Procedure
   a) it is a requisition.
   b) Armed forces bound to carry it out.
   c) by executive order limited to 10 days, beyond that a govt. decision.

III. Apart from dispersal of unlawful assembly, other types of assistance:
   a) Demonstration marches.
   b) Patrol.
   c) Picket.
   d) Post.
   e) Quartering a locality.
   f) Rallying post.
   g) Refugee camp.

IV. a) Not under your command, but specific requests.
    b) Coordination necessary between various forces.
    c) Division of work between various forces.

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8 IAS Phase II, 20.6.81, LBSNAA, Mussoorie
d) Stop use of force.

V.  
   a) Internal Security Scheme.
   b) Briefing of situation/control room.
   c) Camping facilities for troops.

VI. Rank equation.

VII. Social Relationship:
   a) Dress.
   b) Protocol.
   c) Rank.
   d) Hospitality.
   e) Liquor.
THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF COMMUNAL RIOTS IN INDIA

N. C. Saxena

It is generally believed by historians that relations between the Muslims and Hindus during the medieval period in India were cordial. There was generally mutual tolerance and an absence of positive ill will which continued till the end of the nineteenth century. However, there are a few isolated instances of communal violence taking place in India much before the British, consolidated their power.

The first riot, of which an authentic version is available, took place at Ahmedabad in 1730. A Hindu gentleman lit the Holi fire against the wishes of his Muslim neighbour. The Muslim neighbour on the following day slaughtered a cow in honour of the Prophet. Enraged, the Hindus in the neighbourhood attacked the Muslims gathered at the place killing one. The Muslims, now aided by regular Afghan soldiers, fought back. In the resulting riots, a number of Hindus and Muslims were killed and there was also extensive damage to property. All business and trade in Ahmedabad was suspended for three or four days. Several leaders from both sides appealed to the Emperor and peace was then restored.

The District Gazetteer of Banaras (1909, 207-8) describes a riot of 1809 in Banaras as “one of those convulsions which had frequently occurred in the past

owing to the religious antagonism between the Hindu and Mussalman sections of the population”. The chief source of conflict was a mosque built by Aurangzeb on the site of an old temple. The serious nature of the riots can be gathered from the fact that order was not restored by the troops until some fifty mosques had been destroyed and several hundred persons had lost their lives.

After 1890, riots on the occasion of religious festivals became a common feature. Such incidents were concentrated in those districts of North India where socio-political activity on the part of the organised groups like the Arya Samaj, the Muslim League, Hindu Sanghathan groups, the Tabliq movement, etc., were prominent. Almost no riot took place in the princely states where the above-mentioned groups were not active. There seems to be a positive correlation between periods of intense rioting and deterioration of relations between the top political leaders of the two communities. Thus, around 1916 when the Congress and Muslim League decided to collaborate with each other after the Lucknow Pact, very few riots took place, but the failure of the Khilafat agitation and the resultant bitterness manifested itself in street violence in many places.

A special mention may be made of the Moplah riots of 1921 which occurred in the Malabar region, a part of Kerala. There had been sporadic outbreaks of Moplah violence since 1836. These involved attacks by Moplahs on Hindu landlords and sometimes on English authorities. The outbreaks reflected the existence of both agrarian exploitation and rural poverty. The Namboodiri
Brahmans and Nairs held superior tenurial rights whereas land was cultivated by the Moplahs. Throughout the period between 1836 and 1921 whenever the Namboodiri and Nair landlords tried to evict their tenants, violence was provoked. The Moplahs were bitterly anti-Hindu, bitterly anti-British, bitter against the world that gave them only misery. During the later part of the Khilafat movement, the Moplahs became convinced that the rule of the Khalifa had been established in India and they wreaked violence on the Hindu landlords and their men. They also tried to convert many of them to Islam. The army had to be sent for and it took the British Government more than 6 months to control insurrection. Of the Moplah rebels, 2266 were killed in action, 1615 were wounded, 5688 were captured, and 38,256 surrendered. Moplah prisoners were court-martialled and shot or executed (Smith 1946). The agrarian aspect of this violence was unfortunately lost sight of by the leaders of that time including Gandhi, and in future relations between the Congress and the Muslim League, the hangover of the Moplah riots continued to weigh on the minds of both the parties.

When the Indian National Congress resigned from the State assemblies in 1939 both the intensity and periodicity of communal violence increased in North India. However, very few riots occurred during 1942-46, which was a period of economic boom for the middle class in India. The peak of communal frenzy was reached during 1946-48. The Calcutta and Naokhali riots, which were alleged to have been inspired by the Muslim League government of Suhrawardy continued in
August 1946 for many weeks. Mahatma Gandhi resorted to a fast unto death till he was assured of peace in Calcutta. The army was called out with orders to shoot curfew breakers. Muslim atrocities in Bengal provoked the Hindus in the neighbouring provinces of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh where Hindu brutality was equally frightful.

The assassination of Mahatma Gandhi in 1948 brought about a change in the attitude of the people on the communal question. The RSS was banned and the Hindu communal elements were greatly weakened. The period between 1950 and 1960 may be called a decade of communal peace. General political stability and economic development in the country also contributed in improving the communal situation. The incidence of communal violence has shown a continuous upward trend since 1964 except for the period 1971-77, which again coincides with a strong political leadership at the central level.

In 1964 serious riots broke out in various parts of East India like Calcutta, Jamshedpur, Rourkela and Ranchi in what appeared to be a chain reaction. Tension erupted in Kashmir earlier over the theft of a holy relic of the Prophet from the Hazratbal mosque. The relic, preserved under strict security conditions, was found missing on 27 December, 1963 and this caused an immediate reaction among the people in Kashmir. Their anger was mainly directed against the carelessness of the government and had no trace of communal colour. Although the box was discovered within a week, the incident led to serious riots in Khulna (in Bangla Desh), which caused panic
among the Hindu population. They began migrating to India, carrying with them harrowing and sometimes exaggerated tales of their woes. As a reaction atrocities were committed against Muslims in the above-mentioned places in India. According to Shri S. K. Ghosh, who was then Additional Inspector General of Police in Orissa, two thousand people, mostly Muslims, were killed in Rourkela alone in riots which lasted for about 15 days (Ghosh 1974).

Another wave of communal violence swept across the country in 1967 and continued till 1970, when the central leadership was weak. Many North Indian States were controlled at that time by SVD governments. Inability and hesitation to use brute force against the rioters due to weak and wavering political leadership were responsible for the continuance of such riots for a number of days.

The break up of communal incidents for some states for the period between 1968 and 1979 is given in Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1 Incidence of Communal Disturbances</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andhra Pradesh</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assam</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bihar</td>
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<tr>
<td>Delhi</td>
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<td>Gujarat</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jammu &amp; Kashmir</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kerala</td>
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<td>Madhya</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Page 61 of 61
Table 2 Casualties in riots between 1977 and 1980

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of persons killed</th>
<th>Number of persons injured</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>1122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>1853</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>2296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>2691</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Home Ministry Reports

Some of the common features of communal riots in the last 20 years are:

(a) A region, particularly in an urban area, with a Muslim minority population ranging between 20 and 40 per cent of the total population seems more prone to disturbances than other regions. However, there are notable exceptions such as Shahjahanpur,
Saharanpur, Lucknow, Gorakhpur and Faizabad where Muslims form 46%, 39%, 30%, 26% and 21% of the population respectively. As against these, percentages of Muslims in the populations of some communally sensitive towns are Moradabad: 51%, Firozabad: 40%, Aligarh: 38%, Meerut: 37%, Varanasi: 26%, and Allahabad: 24%. These towns also have a strong concentration of Muslim artisans, a few of whom have become manufacturers and exporters and are doing quite well.

(b) Areas where Hindu refugees from Pakistan are settled in significant numbers are more combustible.

(c) The probability of recurrence of riots in a town seems to be directly proportional to the number of riots which have taken place in that town in the past. In other words, some districts become communally sensitive whereas others remain peaceful although the socio-economic and demographic characteristics of the Muslim population may be the same in these two categories of towns.

(d) Riots seem to be more common in North India, specially in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, although riots have occurred in Southern states also. Within Uttar Pradesh, western U.P. seems to be more prone than eastern U.P. The percentage of ‘Ashrafs’, immigrant Muslims from Central Asia and converts from high castes, is also higher in west Uttar Pradesh than in the east.

(e) In British India and also soon after partition most riots took place on the occasion of religious festivals. The playing of music before a mosque and cow killing were two common incidents which invariably
sparked off violence. However, from this alone it should not be concluded that riots are a result of religious differences between the two communities. Religion is just a badge by which hostile communities identify themselves and each other. Although at the metaphysical level there are serious differences between Hinduism and Islam, at the popular level there had been and still is a great deal of fusion in religious practices and beliefs. As languages Hindi and Punjabi, Assamese and Bengali, Hindi and Urdu may not be very different, but this objective similarity does not render the conflict between the speakers, of these languages artificial and irrelevant. Symbolic insults to the religions, such as music before a mosque and cow killing, become significant because of the intensity of feelings which are generated by these symbols which in turn is determined by the way these symbols are associated with political power, history or the pride of various groups. Religion is the outer cover; the inner core of group conflict is to ensure secular power and dominance over the other group.

(f) As already stated, more riots have occurred when the central authority was weak, between 1961 and 1964, 1967 and 1970 and 1978 and 1980.

(g) It is difficult to assert whether communal hatred or violence is on the increase or on the decline. What appears more obvious is that brutality and the use of deadly weapons is increasing while the duration of a riot is getting reduced. Another conclusion which follows from a comparison of pre-sixty and post-sixty riots is that in the latter period violence by and
large remains a localised phenomenon and does not spread to neighbouring towns. The Moradabad riots of 1980 were an exception to the above rule.

(h) Muslim majority towns of the Kashmir valley, West Bengal and Kerala have remained unaffected as far as serious riots are concerned.

II

It is hazardous to offer explanations for the continuance of communal violence in India. Unfortunately very few empirical studies have been carried out in an objective and unbiased manner which could throw light on the causes of the riots. The response of the government, press and public figures to such riots has become more or less stereotyped and even predictable. There is a strong condemnation of the so-called communal groups, anti-social elements are held responsible, a sinister foreign hand is seen pulling the strings, pious statements are made in favour of national integration, a commission of enquiry is appointed, and soon afterwards everything is forgotten until we are shocked by a fresh wave of violence. In private people blame one or the other community, but in public care is taken not to hurt any group’s sensibilities. The villain is always located somewhere else — economic frustration, legacy of the British, political opportunism, etc.

Communal violence should be distinguished from protest movements like the anti-reservation agitation in Gujarat, the Assam riots, the Punjabi Subba riots, etc., in which there is a group which organises itself on the basis of grievances felt, real or imaginary, demands are articulated, people feel aggrieved and wronged because
of certain Government policies, an attempt is made to get certain concessions from the regime and such a protest action leads to confrontation with the police. Communal riots take place in an entirely different setting. There is no articulation of demands, organisation of groups seems to be informal, leadership is spontaneous and not sharply defined, and the administration is not generally directly involved in the initial stages of the tension.

Communal violence needs to be distinguished from communal prejudice and communal conflict. Prejudice, conflict and violence are inter-related, one leads to the other, and yet these three sociological expressions of inter-community relations have an autonomy of their own. Each may exist independent of the other two. Till the early sixties there was a great deal of racial prejudice against the Blacks in the United States of America and yet violence remained on a low key. The Hindu-Punjabis and the Sikh-Punjabis were on opposite sides of the conflict over the creation of the Punjabi Suba between 1950 and 1963 and yet there was very little violence. Two groups may be fighting each other for control over political, economic and administrative resources, like the Brahmans and the non-Brahmans in Madras during 1910-40, yet the informal rules of the game of not aggravating conflict into street violence may be observed by both the groups. The Shiv Sena agitation in Maharashtra was directed against the South Indians, yet very few South Indians lost their lives. There is prejudice against Punjabis in Uttar Pradesh but it leads to neither conflict nor violence. Muslims in Sri Lanka do not mix with, the other communities and yet are at peace with
them. Thus it is meaningful to study prejudice, conflict
and violence separately.

Prejudice is an attitude that predisposes a person to
think, feel and act in biased ways toward a group and its
individual members. A prejudiced individual evaluates a
person belonging to a certain group not as a person but
on the basis of his group membership. When Ahmad
cheats Bashir, Bashir thinks that Ahmad is a cheat. But
when Gupta cheats Bashir, he thinks that all Hindus are
cheats. Certain negative traits are first associated with
members of the other group and all individuals are then
presumed to have those objectionable qualities ascribed
to that group. Prejudice results in five types of rejective
behaviour, talking ill of the other group with friends,
avoidance, discrimination, physical attack, and in its
extreme form, it leads to a desire for the extermination of
the other group.

An average Hindu’s prejudice against the Muslim
community is because of his misconceived perception of
firstly, the attempts made by the Muslim rulers in
medieval times to destroy Hindu culture; secondly, the
separatist role played by the Muslims in the freedom
struggle; thirdly, their refusal to modernise themselves
and accept the uniform civil code, family planning, etc.,
and lastly, their having extra-territorial loyalties. After
the riots of Ahmedabad many educated Hindu rioters felt
that they had avenged the plundering of Somnath temple
by Mahmud of Ghazni. An incident which had taken
place ten centuries before was still fresh in the minds of
the Hindus and in their perception, an attack on the
present day population of Muslims meant vindicating
themselves against Mahmud of Ghazni.
School textbooks also unfortunately encourage anti-Muslim feelings by teaching and praising the culture and values of the majority community.

Muslim prejudice against the Government and the majority community is derived from their heightened sense of discrimination in jobs, from a belief that conscious and concerted efforts are being made to wipe out their language and culture, and that the Hindu communal groups are always conspiring to perpetrate genocide on them.

Muslims in India have acquired the psychology of a deprived group, they compare their status with Muslims of other Muslim majority countries, or with their own status during the British days when they had a strong political party, administrative and political reservations, separate electorates and a godfather in the British empire. They have not been able to come to grips with the changed realities of a secular country, and they feel alienated. Due to the migration of the urban professional Muslim class to Pakistan the percentage of Muslims in Government jobs declined soon after independence. This percentage has continued to be low, of which discrimination is a minor causative factor, other reasons being lack of preparedness and sufficient educational qualifications. This has further increased the Muslim the sense of frustration.

With such feelings of alienation and perceived persecution an ordinary incident like a Hindu band playing music in front of a mosque or the presence of a few pigs before a religious congregation takes on an entirely different meaning in the Muslim mind. They see it as a gross and violent manifestation of sacrilegious and
vindictive hostility not only to individual Muslims but to the sacred tradition of Islam, being perpetrated not by a few uncouth and brutal rowdies but by the entire Hindu community which is bent upon punishing them. Thus, an incident which may be trivial in nature leads to a chain reaction ending in violence.

They see the police force as a symbol of the Hindu communal elements, and by attacking it in their moments of anger and frustration bring the worst calamity onto themselves. The police constables and sub-inspectors are recruited from the lower classes of society and are often prejudiced against Muslims, who are seen by them as criminals, suspects, communal and irrational people.

Conflict arises when two groups compete with each other for a better share in political power, government jobs on social status. Conflict may also arise if two groups follow mutually contradictory goals in matters of political and cultural policies. The Hindus would like to define an ideal society as one in which all citizens participate freely in all forms of social interaction, with no concern for communal affiliation. In their view, the State should not be concerned with problems of any group based on religion. It may allow for some degree of cultural diversity, but its basic premise should be denial of any social obligation to preserve communal identities. On the other hand, most minority group leaders will view this lack of protection for their cultures as tyranny. They would prefer the Government to follow policies of pluralism in which privileges are distributed to groups according to their proportion in the population.

Thus in India right up to 1935 responsible leaders of both the Congress and the Muslim League desired
Hindu-Muslim unity, but there was a basic difference in their approach. The Congress thought of unity in terms of fusion and obliteration of communal moulds, while the Muslim leadership visualised unity as a federation in which group identity was not destroyed and this led them to demand a federal government with a weak, centre with a Muslim share in all wings of the Government guaranteed by the Constitution. The Hindu leaders were prepared to grant cultural autonomy but not such rights which would imply that Muslims constituted a political community. The struggle continued till it resulted in the partition of the country.

As India cannot be partitioned any further, the strategy of the Muslim community to create yet another political federation for itself had to be given up. Instead, the nature of their demands changed. They demanded cultural and educational rights for themselves such as status for Urdu, preservation of the Muslim Personal Law, job reservation, minority status for Aligarh Muslim University, etc. Such demands appear to the Hindus as weakening the unity of the nation and are, therefore, opposed.

Apart from religious minorities there are linguistic groups in India as well which have demanded from time to time separate states and more federal rights for their regions. Although in the early fifties such demands were interpreted as divisive and detrimental to national integration, there has been an increasing willingness to accommodate regional demands. There is no evidence that the strategy of promoting regional identification by creating states based on languages has either proved to be divisive or prevented economic growth. On the other
hand, it has reduced conflicts directed against the Central Government, has regionalised politics and has increased the political participation of the masses. The attitude of the Central Government towards religious minorities has been different, only partly because of the heritage of partition and the memories of the intense conflict which took place in the first half of the twentieth century. But the more important reason why religious demands have not been accommodated lies perhaps in the geographical dispersal of Muslims in the country. Since they are in a minority not only in all the states (except Jammu and Kashmir) but also in all the districts (except Murshidabad and Mallapuram) Muslims cannot convert their cultural identity into a political pressure group nor can privileges of a political nature be granted to them. Since Muslim MPs have to depend on substantial Hindu support for winning in elections, they cannot openly espouse Muslim causes. This makes the Muslims feel isolated and embittered. Certain Muslim papers and rejected political leaders have developed a vested interest in romanticising and highlighting Muslim grievances. It suits them if the Muslim masses suffer from a sense of permanent injury; it will keep their readership and leadership intact. Objective analysis will perhaps show that Muslim problems are not so much the cause of the disturbed Muslim mind as the consequence of that disturbance which is a result of the lack of political participation on terms to their liking.
As already stated prejudice and conflict have to be distinguished from violence. Certain general conditions which transform conflict into violence are:
1. Relative deprivation—high
2. Legitimacy of the government—low
3. Channels of communication—blocked.
4. Insecurity among a group—high.
5. Dehumanisation—widely practised.
7. Instruments of violence—readily available.

The direct cause of the eruption of violence has to be sought in administrative lapses. When law and order machinery is on the verge of breaking down, the two communities start losing faith in district administration for the maintenance of peace. Each community then starts contributing by emotional and financial support to its anti-social fringe elements for their physical and emotional defence. Such elements now begin to indulge in arson, looting and killing, thereby further aggravating the breakdown of law and order. Another administrative explanation, which may sound tautological, is that violence is habit-forming and continued riots in a town leads to an acceptance of violence as the only means to settle inter-community issues, thereby resulting in a vicious circle. This may partly explain the reasons for the continued occurrence of riots in certain towns in Uttar Pradesh in the past three decades.

Many writers have tried to find economic factors behind such riots. Economic arguments may be expressed in a number of ways. First, it is asserted that most of the employers, industrialists and middlemen are Hindus, whereas most of the employees, workers and artisans are Muslims. Therefore, communal riots are a distorted form of class-conflict. Second it is hypothesised that there is a competitive conflict of interests within the middle class and among the self-employed people over access to a
given array of opportunities like government jobs, export contracts, market shares, etc. Since identities of groups have already been formed on religious lines, which are time-resistant in nature, group clashes occur along communal lines just as in Bihar, where there is a clash of interests between caste groups like Brahmins, Rajputs, Bhumihars and Kayasthas. Third, it is alleged that communal clashes are deliberately planned and encouraged in order to ensure that people do not begin identifying themselves with the economic class to which they belong. Exponents of this explanation find a strong co-relation between periods of economic slump in traditional artisan-based activities and periods of communal clashes. Fourth, it is asserted that even present economic crises in our society and the persistence of scarcity conditions have led to the brutalisation of every day existence, leading not only to communal violence but to increased atrocities over women, scheduled castes and members of the weaker sections of society. In a stagnant economy there would always be a greater danger of violence against those who are not regarded as full members of the society, who are living beyond the pale of legitimacy in the eyes of the majority group, and whose existence is marginal.

There is a general impression that the irresponsible behaviour of politicians is a major factor in escalating communal tensions. Some people go to the extent of asserting that politicians have a vested interest in perpetuating Hindu-Muslim differences as feelings of insecurity push Muslims to vote as a block which helps the political parties.
The role of politics in communal violence can be discussed at two levels, the national policy level, and the district level where politicians compete with each other within and outside the party maintaining their hold over different segments of the population. These aspects of political involvement will be discussed separately.

There are broadly two kinds of policy which may be followed in declining group demands. One seeks the assimilation of the entire population of the state so that it shares a common identity. Only individual rights, privileges and duties are recognised. The Soviet Union and Thailand have been pursuing this approach toward the Muslim segment of their population. The success of this method depends on the willingness of the minority group to abandon their group demands and merge with the more dominant group. The other approach recognises the existence of differentiated groups in the population and concedes to such groups, rights, privileges and obligations based on their proportion in the population. Lebanon and Malaysia have been following this approach where political and administrative reservations for various religious and racial communities are built into the constitution. No general guidelines can be laid down as to which approach should be followed. Much would depend on the history, traditions and economic capabilities of the two communities as also on the nature of the state, whether it is authoritarian, democratic, elitist, etc. From the experience of other communally divided societies perhaps it can be suggested that if the political leaders seek to bring about an identity between state and nation, the problem of conflict management becomes more complicated.
The Government of India has been following, and perhaps rightly so, a middle-of-the-road policy as far as Muslims are concerned. It frowns upon demands of a covertly political nature, such as those for a separate electorate, proportional representation, the formation of religious parties, etc.; at the same time conceding cultural and educational demands like encouragement to Urdu, the preservation of Muslim Personal Law, minority status to the Aligarh Muslim University, etc. Thus the central government’s ideal seems to be political assimilation and cultural pluralism. This, however, leaves a certain amount of grey area, the most important issue being the reservation of jobs, whether formal or informal. Purely in the interests of communal harmony it will be better to once and for all take decisions on such issues, rather than giving the impression that the issues are negotiable on the eve of the elections, or allowing the increase of communal agitations for and against such demands.

The role of district level politicians in communal violence can be understood in a number of ways. Since economic growth is taking place at a very slow rate the politicians can indulge only in the politics of distribution and not of production. Politics being the art of the possible, the politicians find it more paying in terms of votes to appeal to the people in the name of caste, religion and language. Thus local politics often assumes the character of a zero-sum game with a built-in-potential for social conflict. At the same time, since in a mixed constituency legislators have to depend on the votes of both the communities, the Muslim legislators belonging to all-India parties are often constrained to
eschew the more militant form of protest as far as Muslim causes are concerned and are obliged to work behind the scenes.

The nomination and selection processes within a party also tend towards the selection of docile and moderate Muslims for party tickets. Muslims had by and large voted for the Congress party in the general elections of 1952, 1957 and 1962, but there was a growing feeling among them that their vote was being taken for granted and in the 1967 elections the Congress party did not get as massive support from them as it had been used to get in the past. The Congress party succeeded in winning back their vote in 1971 but lost it again in 1977. Since then the all-India political parties seem to be under the impression that the moderate articulation of Muslim demands will not result in any loss of Hindu votes but will ensure them the minority support, hence the scramble among them to woo the Muslim electorate.

Apart from the legislators there are a number of disgruntled politicians, teachers, journalists and members of extremist organisations who do not have to contest Assembly or Parliament elections and, therefore, do not suffer from the constraint of seeking votes from both the communities. These people tend to take extreme views on communal questions and though they may not have mass support, they can arouse mass passions during periods of tension. Their activities being a greater source of nuisance, the district administrations take a tough view of them.

To conclude, sectarian violence needs multi-causal analysis and a deeper understanding. Certain important
questions as those listed below still remain unanswered. An objective study of specific riots in India may throw more light on their nature and provide us with clues to understand the following questions that still remain unanswered: —

1. If A attacks B in a communal riot, what was the relationship between A and B before the riot? Were they known to each other, was there a casual acquaintance or business rivalry between them or were they members of two different factions with long standing enmity? What are the relations between such people after the riots? Or are they still unknown to each other? What kind of people participate in the communal frenzy?

2. It is generally believed that while people of the lower class actually participate in the riots, leadership is provided by the middle class and funds are provided by business people. To what extent is this true? In case there is an involvement of different classes of people, either psychological or physical, what is the nexus between such classes? How are the ideas actually transmitted? Where, if at all, are any meetings held where decisions are taken to attack the other community?

3. There is a difference between preparedness and conspiracy. Do communal riots occur as a result of preparedness or after conspiracy?

4. What are the backgrounds of the so-called communal leaders? Why does extremist ideology appeal to some and not to the rest of the people? Is it because of economic frustrations?
5. What class of people are responsible for the spread of rumours? Why are some rumours strongly believed and others disbelieved?

6. So far administration has believed in only three kinds of control—curfew, large-scale arrests and peace committee meetings. Each method has its own limitations. Curfew results in large-scale hardships. It sharpens the anger of the entire community and focuses it against the police. Large-scale arrests tend to be arbitrary and often of antisocial elements most of whom may not participate in rioting. Peace committee meetings sharpen the communal identities of the leaders. Can there be other more successful methods of control?

7. Who are the members of the Peace Committee? Are they prominent members of the communities or are they so-called secular people with very little hold over the masses?

8. Behind communal riots is a feeling of strong prejudice and hostility between the communities. How can local administration reduce such feelings during times of peace.

9. What kind of training can be given to the Police and P.A.C. to improve the functioning and the image of these forces?

10. What is the relationship between the recurrence of riots and the trade cycle of local industries?

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II
AN ANALYTICAL STUDY OF THE MEERUT RIOT
Asghar Ali Engineer

Meerut, about seventy kilometres from Delhi, has historical importance in that the first rumblings of the 1857 mutiny began here when the Hindu and Muslim soldiers resolved to fight together against the British rulers, unitedly declared war against their British masters and marched towards Delhi. Meerut has had the long tradition of communal harmony and till today the festival of Nauchandi is celebrated with great fanfare by Hindus and Muslims together. Although common Hindus and Muslims have lived and pursued their avocations together, the vested interests in both the communities have often tried to disrupt the harmony. The present riot has not changed the situation. During my extensive tour of the riot-affected areas I did not find bitterness in any one community against the other; on the contrary the sufferers and their sympathisers, bitterly complained against the PAC, the city police and district officials in league with some communal elements.

In Meerut, which has a population of more than five lakhs, the municipality has recently been converted into a municipal corporation. The ratio of Hindus to Muslims in Meerut is 51:49, according to some district authorities. One sees locality after locality exclusively inhabited by Muslims. There are also several localities where the Hindus and Muslims live together in harmony and peace. The corporation elections which people then believed would soon be held also cast an ugly shadow over communal peace in the town.
Most of the Muslims are engaged in handloom work. They are generally weavers and some of them even own looms. The cloth produced by them is generally sold to the Hindu traders—Bania who, interestingly in Meerut, as elsewhere, are the bedrock of the RSS. These conservative traders finance the local RSS and now also the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP). A large section of Muslims are also engaged in producing scissors and brass bands, the latter being the exclusive monopoly of the Muslims. Many Muslims who own brass-band manufacturing units are quite prosperous. While the majority of Muslims are quite poor, one can see a section of well-to-do Muslims in Meerut, unlike in other places.

Recently a number of field studies of communal riots have suggested certain common characteristic features which are as follow:

1. Communal riots generally take place in middle-sized towns.
2. The proportion of Muslims in such towns happens to be high, usually more than 30%.
3. A section of Muslims in such towns is generally well to do and tends to be a potential competitor for the Hindu traders.
4. The riots now tend to be well planned and last for several days or weeks; they are no longer spontaneous outbursts they used to be earlier.
5. The core issues, more often than not, happen to be of either an economic or political nature whereas the spark is provided by some trivial incident.

In the Meerut riot all these features are more or less present. It is a middle-sized town with a very high
proportion of Muslim population (around 49%). A section of Muslims is quite prosperous and has political ambitions of its own. In 1982 both the MP as well as MLA are Muslims (Mohsina Qidwai and Manzoor Ahmad, both from Congress (I)). Here too, as will be shortly evident, the riots were well planned and lasted for more than four weeks. The pattern of setting fire to houses and stabbing showed special training in both the acts. Another feature of these riots is the large role played by the anti-social elements who are seeking political legitimation and respectability through participation in such riots. They emerge as the saviours of their respective communities. The increasing use of illegal weapons and other incendiary materials in a systematic way is also a pointer in this direction. According to R. D. Tripathi, the city S.P., until 7 October, the police had seized 31 knives, 1599 sharp weapons, 10 country-made revolvers, 28 bombs, 27 litres of acid, 16 kg of potash and 150 kg of other bomb-making material. What has not yet been seized must be much more than this. All this clearly shows the planned nature of the riots and the systematic participation of anti-social elements in them.

There is another important dimension of the Meerut riot which is worth noting. A conscious attempt was made to incite the Dalits to fight against the Muslims. There are several reasons for this. Some of them are as follows:

(a) After the conversion of some Harijans to Islam at Meenakshipuram, the VHP, which derives its cadre mainly from the RSS, is trying its best to woo the Harijans. In this respect it pays off a great
deal to carry on aggressive anti-Muslim propaganda among the Dalits. In northern India in general, and in Uttar Pradesh, in particular, such propaganda pays rich dividends and keeps tension between the Muslims and Dalits alive. Before the Meerut riots, clashes occurred near Turkman Gate in Delhi in July ‘82 between the Muslims and Dalits had occurred. That too was by deliberate design as the field inquiry shows. Such tactics keep Harijans away from the Muslims and wreck efforts at unity between the two. 

(b) The RSS, by using Harijans thus in the forefront to fight against Muslims, can preserve their cloak of neutrality and even pretend innocence in the communal conflict. This has become necessary in a way, as its political arm (the BJP) has politically adopted the secular posture and even pretends to pledge itself by to Gandhian socialism.

(c) Such a strategy, while promoting the myth of religious solidarity, helps bring about division among the have-nots of society.

In Meerut, it was alleged by Mrs. Harpal Singh, a teacher in the Department of Education, of Nanak Chand College, Meerut, the caste Hindus used the members of the Valmiki community (i.e. Bhangis—sweepers), who are extremely poor, to fight the Muslims by proxy. It is rumoured, she said, that the Valmikis were given Rs. 200 and a bottle of liquor for killing one Muslim. Even if it is not wholly true it at least shows the emerging new trend among the upper caste Hindus. Mrs. Singh stated that Mr. Mohanlal Kapoor, ex-MLA belonging to the BJP, now comes from a distance to perform puja along with the Harijans. This newfound love for Harijans is being
displayed with a calculated motive: it could bring about split in the Harijan votes which are normally exercised in favour of the Congress I. It is also interesting to note that only the poor and illiterate Valmikis have fallen into the RSS trap. The Chamars who are more educated and conscious are nowhere on the scene.

A look at the genesis of the riot shows it to be political rather than economic. There is no apparent economic rivalry between the Hindus and Muslims. However, the political cause is quite apparent. The high percentage of their population (49%) makes Muslims politically very important. Their support to any political party becomes crucial, along with the Harijan votes. Hence a conscious attempt to woo the Harijans is being made by the RIP. At present, as pointed out earlier, both the seats, i.e., that of MP and MLA are held- by the Cong. (I) in the city. Even at the height of anti-Congress feelings immediately after the emergency, Mr. Manzoor Ahmad of the Indira Congress had won the assembly seat, wresting it from Mr. Mohanlal Kapoor of the then Jansangh. Since then the Jansangh (now BJP) has been trying to increase its political clout.

To understand the genesis of this riot it is necessary to know what happened immediately before in Meerut. Balasaheb Deoras, the RSS chief, visited Meerut in January 1982. Surprisingly a rally was held in his honour on the Government Inter College Compound. More surprising was the fact that the Superintendent of Police Mr. Pyarelal (S.P. City) and Additional District Magistrate Mr. Rajkishor Mishra saluted Balasaheb publicly. Both these officers, it is interesting to note, are
notorious for their anti-Muslim bias and it is these officers who ordered firing on Muslims on 29 and 30 September and 1 October 1982 which resulted in 29 deaths. The tension began to mount after Balasaheb’s visit to the city. The Mazar-Temple controversy which we will shortly describe began to assume serious proportions from the month of April 1982. Also throughout the months of August and September the activities of BJP and VHP were quite prejudicial to the cause of communal peace in the town.

From 19 to 21 September 1982 the VHP held a meeting of its national committee at Varanasi, and on 20 September it passed a resolution that if the disputed temple was not unlocked (the administration had sealed the place as we shall see later) the VHP would start state-wide agitation. Similarly on 2 and 3 October the RSS-dominated BJP Youth organisation held its convention at Allahabad and passed a resolution that the people should be alert against anti-national elements who want to destroy the Indian cultural, social and political fibre—thereby hinting at the Muslims. All this was reported prominently in the local Hindi press which naturally aggravated the situation.

Another interesting fact to note is that in the elections to the newly formed Municipal Corporation, that people believed would soon take place each party had an interest. The BJP was making a serious bid to capture the corporation. The Congress (I) had its own factional politics which is no less interesting. Due to the high proportion of Muslims in the population, the tickets for MLA and MP’s seats are generally given to Muslim
candidates, which allegedly causes heartburning to the non-Muslim candidates. A source close to the Congress (I) told me that the city Congress (I) president Mr. Dharam Devakar and the DCC president Mr. Shanti Tyagi both have, of late, developed pro-RSS sympathies. Mr. Dharam Devakar, according to this source, wants to become mayor of the city with the help of BJP. When I checked with other sources it emerged that Mr. Devakar certainly played a partisan role which encouraged the administration to take an anti-Muslim posture.

In this series of background events one more event warrants our notice In July 1982 the VHP held a camp at Hardwar to train people for carrying on its Jana Jagaran campaign. These trained volunteers came to Meerut and poisoned the atmosphere. It was alleged by Mr. Brig Rajkishore, a leading advocate of Meerut and secretary of the CPI (Meerut city) that it was one of these volunteers of the VHP who killed the Pesh Imam Mazhar Ahmad in July.

We will now proceed to narrate, in proper sequence, the events connected with the Mazar-Temple controversy and how vested interests from both the communities took advantage of this controversy to advance their own interests. These events would show how a small dispute, due to powerful vested interests, can assume the proportions it did in Meerut.

In Shahghasa, a busy commercial locality of Meerut, are mainly cloth shops owned by Hindu traders who buy their cloth from Muslim-weavers. It is a narrow street. Near one end of this street there is a peepal tree squeezed between a pan shop and a piao (a water hut). Near the
peepal tree and behind this piao is an old well, during the partition riots, a few dead bodies were discovered, and hence under the instructions of Sardar Patel, the then Home Minister, the well was enclosed by high walls.

Adjacent to this well, in an extremely narrow by-lane is a house belonging to a Muslim advocate, Qazi Zaheeruddin. Opposite the well, there is some Municipal land which he is alleged to have usurped. There are also three shops adjoining the well. These shops and the well are the property of a trust (although there is no written record thereof) for a piao. But advocate Zaheer-uddin, it is alleged, had an eye on the shops and the well. Urban land is becoming very valuable in Meerut too. There are many Muslims in that area but, according to advocate Brij Rajkishore, they insisted on having a Hindu in charge of the piao so that Hindus could also drink water.

The dispute, therefore, was between the trust and Zaheeruddin and no community was involved. But soon, some Hindu communalists gave it a twist and began to claim that there was a temple there. Different sources testify to the fact that there never was any temple there. However, advantage was taken of the peepal tree to support this claim. The then SP., Mr. Rawat, personally intervened, and in March 1982 a ghanta (bell) was installed and evening aarti (worship) started. No such aarti had been performed before. Now it became a regular practice. To add to this bizarre drama advocate Zaheeruddin employed the equally bizarre tactic of claiming that a Mazar (tomb of a saint) existed there, which again was false. Actually where the Mazar was
claimed to exist, Zaheeruddin had earlier constructed a lavatory.

As tension began to mount due to these claims and counterclaims, it was decided in April 1982 to hold an inquiry into the whole affair and the representatives of both the communities decided not to do anything until the result of the inquiry was made known. The inquiry was completed on 20 August 1982. On 13 August, in violation of the above agreement, and ignoring section 144 which had been imposed on the area, Mr. Mohanlal Kapoor and Brahmpal Singh, president of the city BJP, performed puja at the spot along with their followers. The police rushed to the spot and arrested some twenty-three persons. But at this stage the president of the local Congress (I) intervened and those arrested were released. This gave further encouragement to the Hindu communalists. Some Muslim communalists, on the other hand, were playing up the Mazar issue.

The Magistrate who was to deliver his judgement on the issue on 20 August was prevented from doing so by pressure. Here too the Congress (I) president is reported to have played an active role. The same evening a meeting of some prominent citizens of Meerut was held and an agreement was signed by two Muslims and two Hindus that the ghanta (bell) would not be used neither would the claim for the Mazar be pressed. However, some Muslim leaders who were not included in the signing of the agreement felt insulted. Hakim Saifuddin declared that he would offer chadar (a sheet of cloth) on the Mazar and began collecting money for the purpose.
His sole motive was to defeat the purpose of the agreement.

On 12 September, the authorities sealed the place under section 146 of Cr. P.C. so that no one could enter there either for puja or prayer on the Mazar. The Hindu communalists took this as a challenge and an affront to Hindu sentiments and gave a call for hartal which went on for three days. The bar association then filed a revision petition against the attachment order in the court of district judge. The revision was allowed and attachment held illegal. Thus on 22 September the seal was removed in compliance with the court order. The next day, Mohanlal Kapoor led a victory procession and was hailed as a Hindu hero. He was profusely garlanded.

Baqr Id happened to be on 28 September. The Shahar Qazi Zainul Abidin declared that the Id prayers would not be held at Iddgah but would be held in mosques in different mohallahs and that Muslims would wear black badges in protest against the removal of the seal. Black flags were also hoisted on some Muslim houses. Communal tension which had diffused began mounting again. Hindus now started the campaign to hoist saffron coloured flags in a big way. Soon the situation went out of control and hell was let loose from 30 September to 2 October. Before this, there had been sporadic killings. The Pesh Imam (prayer leader) of a mosque was killed in the last week of August. In retaliation Rambhole (a priest) was killed on 6 September. A Muslim home guard Shabbir was stabbed to death two days later while going on duty. Seventy-year-old Pesh Imam
Shahabuddin who led prayers in the Choti Masjid of Kishanpadd was also killed the same day.

But from 30 September to 2 October, it was genocide by the PAC. Mr. Brij Rajkishore, the CPI Secretary alleged that the PAC were in league with the Hindu communalists. The communalists used to fire from housetops and the PAC jawans would then enter the Muslim houses alleging that the Muslims attacked. Many survivors of the PAC massacre told this writer that their men folk were dragged out of the houses and shot. The houses were also not spared. The meagre belongings of the poor residents were looted. Mr. Zafar Ali, a Junior Engineer who resided in house No. 304C in Hori Nagar was dragged out and shot by the PAC. His house was also partially burnt. The widow of Sherdin told me with tears in her eyes that though she tried to hide her husband behind an old trunk, the PAC jawans spotted him and shot him dead. The widow Raisa Banu has seven small children. Most of the houses in this locality had bullet holes.

The worst affected was Feroze building where live many poor Muslims. It is nothing but a series of semi-pucca dwellings of poor Muslims. Not a single house in this building situated at Bhunran Ka Pul escaped the wrath of PAC. The most pathetic case was that of 21-year-old Iqbal who was the only son of Shabbir Husain, a doctor. The father pleaded with the PAC to spare his son’s life and kill him instead. The PAC jawans shot Iqbal along with his cousin and ordered Dr. Shabbir to load their dead bodies on a truck and wipe the blood clean. On top of it Dr. Shabbir was arrested and put in jail. In Goli
Saniwali Shabana, a 8-year-old girl stabbed several times by the miscreants fortunately survived. There were eleven others from this building who were killed. Also the house of Abdul Aziz Nawaz Khan, a well-to-do Muslim whose two sisters were to many within a couple of days of this incident, was looted. The losses are estimated at 7 lakhs.

I was told that no less than 42 persons were killed on 1 and 2 October, by the bullets of the PAC, and all of them were innocent. One of the tricks, Mr. Manzoor Ahmad (MLA) said, was to explode a bomb, and when people came out to see what had happened they were shot, alleging that they were miscreants. A delegation of some prominent citizens comprising K.D. Sharma of the Department of History, Meerut College; Dr. Harpal Singh, Head of the Department of Political Science, Nanak Chand College, Meerut; Mr. Mansur Ahmad, General Secretary, Scientific Works Association; and Mr. Mahabir Singh, advocate, went round the affected areas of the city and strongly condemned the riots. They said that the RSS and other communal elements in collusion with the district administration let loose the reign of terror on the poor and unprotected workers and toilers of the minority community. The delegation said that there are many minority houses in Meerut today wherein not a single adult has been left alive. Many women have become widows and children rendered orphans. All this has happened to the minority community only. The delegation, after careful inspection, came to the conclusion that all this had been done with careful planning and with the full participation of the PAC and the district administration. The
delegation estimated that on 2 October, about 42 persons were killed by PAC bullets. The delegation also alleged that the officials of the district administration had ordered the PAC jawans to aim at the chests of the victims. (This statement of the delegation was published in an Urdu Daily from Delhi the Al-Jami’at dated 24 October and was verified for me by one of the members of the delegation. Mr. Harpal Singh.)

For want of space, there are several other details of the victims of the riot collected on the spot by me which are not included here. The Meerut riots make a horrible story and are a great blot on the fair name of India. What appeared in the press is hardly a tip of the proverbial iceberg. The national press has given very sketchy reports, revealing the attitude of the big press towards caste and communal riots. The local Hindi press acting as the mouthpiece of the RSS, of course, played havoc by publishing inflammatory material against minorities. Some of these papers are Mayrashtra, Prabhat, Meerut Samachar and Honiara Yug, and going through these papers one can estimate the damage that could have been done. And about the role of the PAC, the less said the better. After every major riot the Government gives its assurance that the PAC will not be employed again, but the same story repeats itself. It is a matter of great shame that the Government cannot even do as little as to refrain from employing the PAC in such delicate situations. Some police officers like the SP (City) Mr. Pyarelal and ADM Rajkishore Mishra were openly and blatantly against Muslims, and what is shocking is that they were not transferred despite the orders given by the Prime
Minister herself. They still continue to be in Meerut and on active duty.

What happened at Meerut is a very sad commentary on the deplorable behaviour of petty-minded politicians who do not let go any opportunity to increase their influence and to gain easy access to power. They have literally no compunction in walking over the dead bodies of innocent citizens to occupy the coveted chair of power. A minor dispute between an individual and a trust was most unscrupulously exploited by them for their own selfish ends and ultimately caused disaster to hundreds of innocent families. In this crafty game of unconscientious politicians at least a hundred lives were lost (ninety Muslims and ten Hindus as if life is divisible between Hindus and Muslims) but that is how the figures are given and properties and business worth more than 100 crores destroyed. What a game for the communal politicians to play!
NOW VADODARA GOES UP IN COMMUNAL FLAMES

Asghar Ali Engineer

The nation had still not overcome the shock of the Meerut communal riot and the newspapers began reporting serious outbreak of communal violence in Vadodara, the second most important city in Gujarat. Gujarat by now has the dubious distinction of being one of the most communal-riot-prone states, and Vadodara is one district which has now has a well-grounded history of communal riots. Vadodara had gone up in flames in the wake of the most cataclysmic riots in Ahmedabad in 1969 and it was here again in September 1981 that communal riots erupted taking a toll of 9 lives according to the Government figures at that time.

Let us note, to begin with, some essential features of Vadodara city. Vadodara has a population of 7.5 lakhs (1981 census). According to the 1971 census Muslims, 85,000 in number, accounted for about 12% of the total population. (The community-wise break-up for 1981 census is not yet released by the authorities.) The Muslims are divided into six sub-communities, i.e. Dawoodi Bohras (1200), Alavi Bohras (6 to 7 thousand), Suleimani Bohras (2000), Dudhwala Jamat, Memons and other Muslims (for these three remaining groups population figures are not available). They are extremely poor, except for the Alavi Bohras and those belonging to the Dudhwala Jamat who have made very good progress. While the Alavi Bohras are known as the Sindhis of the Bohra Community, the Dudhwala Jamat has the monopoly of transport business. Suleimani Bohras and
Memons are trying to come up, but the rest constituting the bulk of the Muslim population in Vadodara are extremely poor and it can be safely said that more than 85% Muslims are below the poverty line in this otherwise prosperous city.

Is business competition behind these riots of October 1982 or behind those in September 1981? It does not seem to be so. But there is another important factor which has created a clash of interests between Muslims and a section of Hindus. The riots in September 1981 and the ones which took place in the last week of October 1982 during Moharram were between Muslims and Hindus, or to be more precise, between Muslims and Kahars (or Bhois) a scheduled caste community. What is the cause of the animosity between the two? In Meerut the Valmikis were incited to kill Muslims, it is alleged, by followers of the RSS and BJP. But, it is interesting to note, these organisations have not played any such role in the Vadodara riots. At least no one has made any such allegation.

What then is the cause of the clash between Kahars and Muslims? The inquiry into this reveals the role anti-social elements have come to play in the political life of the country and how the political patronage being extended to them by certain unscrupulous politicians is causing havoc for the innocent and law-abiding citizens.

Until 1977 some Muslims had the monopoly of illicit liquor business. It has now been taken over by the Kahars, and one Shiva Kahar is now said to be in absolute command of the business. The business is flourishing. It was alleged by some social workers in one
of the seminars held recently that in Vadodara city liquor worth one lakh rupees is sold every day and ‘hafta’ totalling Rs. 60 lakhs per year is paid to the police officials and political bosses. This is a tremendous amount by any account. It is for this reason that Shiva Kahar is said to have very close relations with police officials and some important political bosses of the ruling party, enjoying their patronage. Due to Shiva Kahar, many other members of the Kahar community are having a field day.

Generally the festival of Dashera is celebrated with great fanfare among the middle and upper middle classes and upper castes like Patels, Desais, etc. However, Mr. Hemant Kahar, a CPI worker, told us that this year the Kahars celebrated Dasehra very lavishly. Everywhere in the Kahar locality photographs of Shivaji were hung and real swords and spears kept near the photographs on the occasion of this festival. The celebration of this festival showed how much easy money was flowing into certain sections of Kahars involved in liquor business.

Shiva Kahar was arrested in May 1981 in connection with some group clashes. However, he was provided with all the comforts in jail. Even liquor was being freely supplied to him through the connivance of the police, it was alleged by some social workers. One Alam Shah Diwan, a social worker, lodged a protest with the city police chief in this regard and the then DSP stopped these facilities to Shiva Kahar. This roused the ire of Shiva who swore to take revenge. He was only waiting for an opportunity.
It is important to note certain other facts here. The Marathas constitute 5% of population in Vadodara, as it was once a Maratha state. Marathas who are economically approximately on par with the Muslims (both are quite poor in general) have been traditionally the rivals of Muslims. Bhois or Kahars who are concentrated in Navapura and Panidarwaza (the trouble-prone areas), as pointed out earlier, have rivalry with Muslims in liquor business and gambling rackets.

The 410 days, from 13 September 1981 when the previous riots broke out, to the latest phase of violence were not in fact free of communal tension. The latest phase of riot began, according to Sayyed Nisar Bapu, the deputy Mayor of Vadodara, from on 22 October 1982, when a person in Navapura locality was fatally stabbed. It was followed by some sporadic clashes and curfew was clamped. The Muslims, therefore, decided not to install ‘Tazias’ (imitations of Imam Husain’s tomb in Kerbala, Iraq) in view of the communal tension. However, Mr. Prabodh Rawal, the Home Minister of Gujarat, persuaded the Muslims to go ahead with the installations of ‘Tazias’ and he assured them that no harm would come to them.

The Muslims, on this assurance, installed Tazias the following day and strangely enough the police, Mr. Bapu said, fell upon them on the pretext that they were breaking the curfew. Either the police did not obey the Home Minister or the Home Minister never instructed the police to allow the Muslims to install Tazias. This contentious matter can be resolved only through an inquiry.
About 22 persons were injured in the police firing. Also the police arrested 70 persons of whom 9 were Hindus and the rest Muslims. The Hindus were released after being taken to the police station while 56 Muslims were charged under Section 360.

The tension continued and sporadic incidents of stabbing, stone throwing, etc., continued to occur between 22 and 27 October when major violence broke out. As the Tazia procession taken out by Muslims on 27 October passed through Lal Akhara, the dead bodies of two Muslims were discovered there. Tension gripped the city. A fresh bout of violence began from 29 October.

The authorities decided to call out army, the reason being the shortage of police. However, the army did not play any active role but in fact remained a silent spectator. Even orders for firing were being given by magistrates.

Shiva Kahar was waiting for an opportunity to seek revenge from Muslims (specially those who were his rivals), and in the Bahu-charwada (Panigate area) which is his stronghold, he destroyed every Muslim hut. As pointed out earlier, he pays regular ‘hafta’ to the police who were, therefore, on his side. In fact, when some high-caste Hindu Patels, etc. tried to help Muslims by phoning the police, they were asked to remain silent. Then, it is alleged, their telephone lines went dead. After the operation for demolishing the Muslim huts began, the lights in the locality also went off, which, it is alleged, was done deliberately.

When the Muslims went to lodge complaints they were detained, something which usually happens in all riots.
On 29 October in Nalbandwada in the Mughalwada locality a Hindu was stabbed fatally. The police now entered the Muslim areas and began to terrorise them systematically. Some Muslim leaders allege that earlier when five Muslims were stabbed the police did not arrest anyone. Now it went on the offensive, gate crashed into Muslim houses, dragged them out and severely beat them up. The SRP played the same role here as the PAC played in Moradabad and Meerut.

The Muslims said that generally young males were the targets of attack. Many of them drive rickshaws, and their knees and elbows were broken rendering them crippled. Some other victims have a strange story to tell. Some Muslims were called out of their houses and told to demonstrate the position they took while praying. As each Muslim performed ‘sajda’ (prostrated himself), one police jawan would trample a hand under his boot, another would put his boot on the neck and yet another one would rain lathi blows on the back. All this, the Muslims allege, to revenge the murder of a Hindu.

Unlike in 1969, it must be noted, the high-caste Hindus like Patels, Desais, etc., were, by and large, sympathetic to the Muslims. It was mainly the Kahars who were, on account of rivalry in illicit liquor business, highly hostile towards the Muslims. They were assisted by other low-caste Hindus. The role of the police, of course, as pointed out, was most deplorable. Corruption has made very serious inroads into the police force and innocent citizens suffer on this account in various ways. All the Muslims we met alleged unanimously, that Police Inspector Bramha-Bhatt has played a most notoriously
anti-Muslim role. He is said to be very close to the illicit liquor king and lives a very posh life much beyond his means.

One university teacher commented that the rot has gone very deep. Even the politicians of the ruling party are taking a cut in the haftas given by the bootleggers. Earlier they used to bargain only for election funds but now they haggle for regular haftas. The group rivalry between the ruling, party politicians, Mr. Ashok Bhogilal Patel (who is very close to Mr. Madhavlal Solanki, Chief Minister of Gujarat) and Mr. Sanat Mehta has become proverbial. They even wash their dirty linen in public. One Mr. Kisan Thakar, who was earlier jailed under section 151 for stoning Tazias, serves with Ashok B. Patel and it is alleged, is very close to the illicit liquor gang and is said to be fixing haftas for the politicians, the teacher told us.

The police and the politicians of the ruling party having thus been hand in glove with anti-social elements one can well imagine what can happen to innocent citizens. The Vadodara riot can hardly be called a communal riot in the traditional sense. Everyone we talked to maintained that the well-known communal parties and organisations had no role to play in this conflict. They were nowhere on the scene. Neither there was any political or religious issue involved. There was no dispute even about the procession of Tazias or its route. Unlike some other riot-prone towns, Muslims in Vadodara do not have political ambitions either. According to Mr. Ghulam Dawood Memon, Secretary, Congress-I, Vadodara city, there are no Muslim MLAs
or MPs from there. Out of sixty councillors in the Municipal Corporation, only seven are Muslims, six from the Congress (I) party and one independent. Only the deputy Mayor Syed Nisar Bapur is Muslim. Of the seven Muslim councillors, five have submitted their resignation in protest against the police excesses against Muslims. The two who have not resigned are from those localities which have not been affected. Now pressure is being brought on these councillors to withdraw their resignations and they are being assured that the police officials guilty of excesses against Muslims will be transferred. The Muslim councillors are likely to oblige.

When the communal riots were at their height the two factions of the Congress (I) were busy in mutual recriminations. Ashok Bhogilal Patel being close to the illicit liquor king through his contact man and also being close to the Chief Minister, encouraged police officials to pursue their line freely. A high-level delegation of Muslim MPs and others led by the Indian Union Muslim League met Mrs. Indira Gandhi on 3 November, and apprised-her of the happenings at Vadodara. It was then that the Chief Minister visited Vadodara.

The Home Minister Mr. Prabodh Rawal always spoke of dealing sternly with the situation but hardly did anything of the sort. When many delegations met him at the circuit house to tell him the tale of atrocities on 3 November, Mr. Rawal dismissed them summarily, remarking that he would inquire into the incidents. The victims were bitter that they did not even get a proper hearing. When the minority cell of the Janata Party made a representation to the Home Minister at Gandhinagar through a memorandum, the Home Minister, instead of

Page 101 of 101
receiving the delegation, sent for the armed police and had 51 persons arrested. This is how the Home Minister handled the situation ‘sternly’.

The riots at Vadodara resulted in the loss of seven lives (six by stabbing and one by a police bullet), 55 persons being injured, and 622 being arrested (of which 540 are said to be Muslims) and 31 properties being set on fire. All this was the result neither of communal politics nor of any communal conflict but of political corruption, pure and simple. The extension of political patronage to anti-social elements and acceptance of a share in the spoils was at the root of the trouble, in addition to the factional fight in the ruling party.

Corruption tends to become a way of life in a country with scarce resources. In such a country—with an inequitous socio-economic structure—with the process of development corruption spreads like cancer and affects all walks of life, that of politics much more, as it is one of the ways of perpetuating class rule. Money power and muscle power both are essential and the goon-das nowadays have both.

What happened at Vadodara should not then be surprising.
IV
HYDERABAD RIOTS — AN ANALYTICAL REPORT
Asghar Ali Engineer
In terms of intensity, duration and number of casualties, the Hyderabad riots deserve serious notice. At the time of writing, according to official figures more than 45 persons have died and some 150 have been injured in the riot of September 1983. Unofficial figures put the number of dead at over 70 and those injured at over 200. The riot started on 7 September 1983 and still continues at the time of writing in the first week of October 1983.

Hyderabad has all the characteristic features of a city in which communal conflicts tend to develop. It is a middle class city with a population of 26 lakhs according to the 1981 census; the component of Muslim population is quite high (40 per cent) and it also has a history of communal conflict. Recent field studies show that middle-sized towns with a high percentage of Muslim population—say 20 to 50 per cent and with a past history of communal conflict are more likely than not to have frequent communal eruptions. Before we deal with the current situation it would be quite interesting to understand the background as it would give us better insight into the present developments and would enable us to clearly understand the role of various political parties and groups. Hyderabad, until the Police Action in 1948, was ruled by the Nizam. The period immediately before and after partition was one of communal turmoil in Hyderabad. In fact, it was the only major centre of communal conflict in the South which was, unlike the Hindi-speaking belt in North India, by and large free of communal tension. The Nizam was unwilling to
integrate his state with India and the Razakars were actively supporting him in this matter. The Razakar struggle gave rise to bitter communal conflict and Police Action further embittered it and intensified the conflict. Whereas the Razakar action had embittered Hindus, the Police Action embittered the Muslims. Muslims were very badly affected by the Police Action. Hundreds were killed and thousands lost all they had.

The Muslim ruling class was feudal in nature and way totally ruined after the abolition of Nizam’s rule. Along with it, all those Muslims who were dependent on the feudal system were also ruined. Thus Police Action was, for the Muslims, a calamity of truly disastrous proportions. Those who could, fled to Pakistan. Those left behind were utter destitutes. The old city of Hyderabad was full of such Muslims, and ever since it has been a hotbed of communal conflicts. The Majlis-e-Ittihadul Muslimin, which succeeded the Razakars, has its base among these poor and illiterate Muslims of the old city.

The bitter memories persist even today, among both Hindus and Muslims. During our investigations of the present riot, a young trader Anil Jain told us that during the Nizam’s rule there were poor among the Hindus as well as the Muslims. While the Muslim poor took solace, perhaps pride, in the fact that their coreligionists were ruling, the Hindu poor cursed the Muslim rulers for their fate. Such feelings are quite widespread among the petty bourgeois Hindus in Hyderabad today. The communal organisations play on these feelings whenever it suits them. The Hindu BJP, Arya Samaj and Vishwa Hindu
Parishad, and the Muslim Majlis-e-Ittihadul Muslimin mainly appeal to communal sentiments and bring communal tensions to the threshold of communal violence on the eve of elections or religious festivals. They do this with the calculated aim of consolidating their positions in the respective communities. The main centre of communal conflict is the old city, precisely because there live the poor and illiterate Muslims; and there, side-by-side, live the lower middle-class and petty trading Hindu communities. Most of the properties vacated by the Muslims during Police Action were bought or occupied by Hindus of the above categories. These section of society are much more susceptive to communal propaganda.

It is to be noted that communalism appeals to both, those facing economic decline and those rising, although for different reasons. In the case of a declining society, as that of the Muslims after Police Action, traditional religion is considered an integral part of the social structure and its preservation is associated with the preservation of this social structure. The more such a structure declines, the greater is the tenacity with which people belonging to it cling to traditional religion. The communalists can easily exploit such a situation.

The rising classes, as were the Hindus after the abolition of Nizam’s rule in Hyderabad, also find the appeal of religion irresistible. As for the petty bourgeois i.e. nurtured in a traditional society, religion helps mobilise their co-religionists easily for their economic demands. The communalism of the latter category tends to be aggressive, associated as it is with the rising aspirations
of a class, while that of former category tends to be defensive as it tries to preserve and protect what is left for them.

We must try to understand the situation in Hyderabad and the communal imbroglio there in the light of the above background, it is a well known fact that Majlis-e-Ittihadul Muslimin has its following mainly among the poor and illiterate Muslims of the old city, and the BJP and the RSS among the petty bourgeois sections of the Hindus in the same area.

The present economic condition of the Muslims is not a very happy one. There is some degree of prosperity among three of the Muslim communities viz. the Khojas, Bohras and Memons, all of them being engaged in trade. But the Muslims in general have not improved their lot as yet. However, a large number of Muslims who have gone to the Middle East send remittances to their families in India. But, in view of strong feudal traditions still prevailing among the Muslims of this area, most of these remittances are spent on conspicuous consumption and are not invested in a profitable way. Thus the economic base of the Muslims still remains fragile. In Hyderabad the Muslims, have not emerged as competitors to the Hindus in trade or Industry and thus the economic factor is not responsible for the communal tension as in other cities like Moradabad, Meerut, Biharsharif, Varanasi, Aligarh etc. Here the primary factor appears to be political in nature.

In the old city of Hyderabad, as pointed out earlier, there is a mixed population of Hindus and Muslims. Thus, in any election, there is tough competition between the BJP
and Majlis-e-Ittihadul Muslimin. The riots also erupted during the Assembly elections in early 1983. Then, as now, the main parties responsible for the riots were the BJP and the Majlis. Both parties contend for seats in the constituencies of the old city. Presently there are seven Muslim MLAs in Andhra Pradesh, five of whom belong to the Majlis and two to the Telugu Desam. All the five Majlis MLAs have been elected from the old city, whereas the two Telugu Desam Muslim MLAs won in the suburban constituencies of Hyderabad. One can very well understand the consequences of the keen contest for seats in the old city.

In a ballot box oriented democracy communal conflict is aggravated due to aggressive political campaigns appealing for votes on the basis of caste and communal ties. This was also witnessed during the Kashmir election in June 1983 when Mrs. Indira Gandhi and Farooq Abdullah most aggressively appealed to the Hindu and Muslim sentiments to capture seats in the valley and in Jammu. The BJP and Majlis raise the level of communal conflict to dangerous heights. They feed their voters with the most poisonous communal propaganda in order to retain their support.

The BJP and the Vishwa Hindu Parishad—the latter is a new entrant into the dangerous field of communalism but very aggressive nevertheless—took advantage of the Ganeshotsava to launch aggressive communal propaganda. Big cloth banners were put up at a number of places on which the following slogan was inscribed:

“Implement Nagarcoil Resolution. Declare India a Hindu Republic” —Hindus of Bhagya Nagar
The Ganeshotsava was also celebrated with great fanfare, the Vishwa Hindu Parishad was very conspicuous in the celebrations. Its President, the Maharana of Udaipur, came all the way to participate in this festival this year, We will say more of this little later.

It was in this highly charged atmosphere that certain incidents occurred. A Muslim belonging to the Charminar area threw a stone at a temple near one of the Minars while coming out of a mosque on 7 September. This temple had been constructed comparatively recently. In 1965 one of the stones near the Minar was daubed a saffron colour and an old woman was put in charge of it. In 1970, a pucca temple was constructed here after an RTC bus collided with and damaged the stone. The driver was dismissed from service as he happened to be a Muslim. The incident of stone throwing at the temple created tension in the area. There are a number of Hindu shops in the vicinity. The man was arrested immediately and is still under detention.

The revenge for this desecration was sought to be taken by desecrating a mosque elsewhere. The Allwyn factory was earlier owned by a Muslim and it still employs a large number of Muslim workers. In the compound of the factory there was a grave around which a mosque was constructed. A dispute was raised in respect of the mosque and the case went up to the Supreme Court. The verdict was in favour of the mosque and the court threw it open for public prayer.

Previously the union in the factory was in the control of the CPI, However, slowly it was captured by the BJP and one Pandit Narendra became its leader. Pandit Narendra
had earlier contested the assembly election from the old city area and lost to a Majlis candidate, but he was elected later in a bye-election.

On 8 September, the mosque in the compound of the factory was desecrated allegedly by Pandit Narendra and his men. An idol was installed inside and pictures of Hindu gods were put up. The fans were damaged and the copies of the Koran were thrown into an ablution tank.

Soon the news spread and the Majlis Ittihadul Muslimin gave a call for bandh. When the Chief Minister Mr. N. T. Rama Rao came to know about the bandh call he called a meeting of the Majlis leaders and requested them to withdraw the call. The Chief Minister assured them that he would personally repair the damage done to the mosque and restore it to the Muslims. On this assurance the Majlis leaders agreed to withdraw the call.

However, party politics again played its role in aggravating the matter. It is said that the Congress-I again persuaded the Majlis leaders to go ahead with the bandh. It should be recalled here that in the last assembly election the Muslims had voted en masse for the Telugu Desam. The Congress-I is looking for opportunities to rehabilitate itself with the Muslims and this was one such opportunity. What did it matter if a few lives were lost!

The Majlis leaders went ahead with their bandh programme on 9th September. Up to 11 a.m. the bandh appeared to be a peaceful one, but it took a violent turn thereafter as the Majlis volunteers started forcing shops to down their shutters. On that day a police officer killed two Muslim boys Shakil and Naeem who were returning from college. Shakil, a football player, was aged 20 and Naeem was 16 years of age. The police officer fired from...
a jeep and sped away. His identity has still not been established. After this incident there were cases of stabbing.
The BJP and Vishwa Hindu Parishad were fully exploiting the festival of Lord Ganesh for their own ends. They tried to create tension between Muslims and Harijans. Some BJP men damaged the idol of Lord Ganesha installed by the Lodha and Takore (low caste Hindus) communities in Maddanapeth and Sanga Reddy areas with the intention of blaming the Muslims for this. But the BJP men were caught and the situation saved. The low caste Hindus also ignored the BJP request to join it in a common immersion procession, and organised their own immersion separately.
The stray stabbing incidents continued until 21 September (the day of immersion) when again the matter took a turn for the worse. In Moazzamjahi, now renamed Vinayak Chowk, a huge pandal was erected for the Ganesh function. In fact before 1978 no such function had been held in Hyderabad. It was in 1977-78 when Dr. Chenna Reddy of Congress-I was the Chief Minister that the Ganesh festival began to be celebrated on such a scale. The Chief Minister himself participated in the procession and immersion ceremony. Since then every Chief Minister has participated in the function. One can very clearly see how the ruling classes in India cleverly used religion for political ends, but at the same time are never tired of paying lip service to secularism. In order to distract attention from the deepening economic crises the ruling class encourages religious conservatism. There was a huge gathering in the pandal. The function was presided over by the Maharana of Udaipur. Everyone
wore saffron cap and on all Hindu houses nearby and on
the route of the procession were saffron flags. This was
said to have been done with a view to identify the Hindu
houses while attacking the Muslim houses.
Very provocative speeches were made in the pandal. On
the stage was hung the huge banner with the same
inscription: ‘Implement the Nagarcoil Resolution and
declare India a Hindu Republic’. The Chief Minister Mr.
N.T. Rama Rao attended the function as per the tradition
now well established. He laid stress on Hindu-Muslim
Unity and when he talked of Hindu and Muslim being
brothers (“Hindu-Muslim bhai bhai”) there went up a
slogan from the audience, “Hindu-Hindu bhai bhai”. The
Chief Minister was presented with the saffron cap which
he first declined. But when the Maharana insisted he
wore it for some time and then laid it aside. The tenor of
all other speeches was to protect Hinduism and establish
a Hindu Raj in India.
The immersion procession was accompanied by 32
trucks; many of them, it is alleged, contained lathis and
other weapons. They were hidden under saffron cloth.
The procession followed the prescribed route, but after
immersion it left this route and went through Muslim
inhabited areas attacking Muslim houses on the way. The
police officers did not stop the processionists from
violating the prescribed route. In these attacks no lives
were lost but property was damaged. But what is most
disturbing is that after this the number of stabbing
incidents shot up rapidly and more people were killed.
The narrow winding lanes of old Hyderabad city are
quite suitable for such attacks as the attacker can
immediately disappear down a lane. The attacks are on
both the sides and a number of persons have died. Some sources indicate that more Hindus have died in stabbing incidents. However, most of the victims, it must be noted, are poor and innocent people, whether Hindu or Muslim. It is also said that the knives are dipped in some poisonous acid.

Apart from these grim details, what is important to note is that the communal forces on both sides are having a field day while poor people are dying. Communal and religious identities are being exploited for political ends. Extreme conservatism is being encouraged on both sides. The Majlis is also now organising a *Pankha Julus* procession which was unknown earlier.

Marx aptly made a distinction between ‘religious attitude towards politics’ and ‘political attitude towards religion’. It is the latter which has become the bane of our political life today. Communal politics holds ascendancy in India and this is to be expected. It is the easiest way for the ruling classes to maintain power while ignoring the crisis of underdevelopment.